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ABSTRACT 
 
Religious Tension in Brazil: 
The Rise of Militant Pentecostalism and Implications for Afro-Brazilian Religions 
 
by 
 
Sarah Rachelle Neace 
 
The size, power, and representation of the Pentecostal movement are rapidly 
increasing around the world, particularly in the Global South. This is especially the case in 
Brazil, where conversions from Catholicism and other religions to Pentecostalism have huge 
implications for religious tolerance and even race relations. Vulnerable minority Afro-
Brazilian religions are increasingly targeted by evangelical Christians, particularly by 
Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, creating a tense situation between the two groups. 
Militant groups of Pentecostals have carried out violence against Afro-Brazilian temples and 
practitioners on the ground, as well as hate speech on the internet and other spaces in the 
public sphere.  Brazilians and others commenting on the situation assert that Pentecostals 
target these religions for reasons of competition, and though I do not contest this, I expand on 
this discussion by examining moral disagreements between the two groups as well as the role 
of race and racism. 
In order to investigate some Pentecostal methods for the spread of hate speech and 
violence, I traveled to Rio de Janeiro. I chose the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, a 
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huge and controversial neo-Pentecostal church network, as a case study. The UCKG is one of 
the biggest perpetrators of intolerance against the Afro-Brazilian minority religions. I 
attended numerous UCKG church services in various neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro as an 
observer and a participant. My findings were that the Church promotes a language of war and 
gives a moral justification for worshippers’ battles with nonbelievers, and that it has elements 
of militancy in its proselytism. It also poses itself as the victim, asserting that it is 
discriminated against (for spreading hate) and demanding that its intolerance be tolerated.  
In order to further investigate the motivations behind these behaviors and attitudes, I 
have utilized media coverage, social media, and academic sources. I have found that the 
UCKG is highly competitive for territory and that it additionally denounces Afro-Brazilian 
religions for moral reasons. But furthermore, even though Pentecostals and especially the 
UCKG are racially diverse, I assert that their attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions have racial 
undertones. Examples from Africa where the UCKG demonizes African traditions and 
employs racialized depictions of African peoples shed light on this conversation.  
Overall, this thesis is a conversation about the increasing use of the public sphere on 
the part of evangelicals, and especially militant groups of Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, 
to spread hate against Afro-Brazilian minority religions. These behaviors reflect larger trends 
of increasing religious fervor in the public sphere around the globe, which undermines 
tolerance and secularity, and in this situation, even racial equality. The breadth and 
popularity of this movement in Brazil and globally necessarily makes an understanding of 
these issues crucial to efforts to promote religious and even racial tolerance and equality in 
Brazil and elsewhere. 
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Introduction 
 
On June 14th, 2015, Kailane Campos, an eleven-year-old girl, was attacked in 
northern Rio de Janeiro. Campos is a candomblecista, or a practitioner of an Afro-Brazilian 
religion called Candomblé. She and her grandmother were leaving a religious temple, dressed 
in the white robes of Candomblé, when two men started shouting at them. Campos’ 
grandmother (a mãe de santo, or temple leader) has been quoted recalling that the men 
shouted out “diablo” meaning “devil,” “vai para o inferno” meaning “go to hell,” and “Jesus 
está voltando” or “Jesus is returning.” One of the men hit Campos over the head with a rock 
and then both men fled by bus. The police never identified them.1 Three days later, at the 
doorway of a police building where Campos was going in for a forensic exam, she and her 
grandmother experienced a new instance of intolerance. A stranger approached them and 
identified himself as evangelical. He insulted them, told them to “burn in hell,” and criticized 
the validity of the investigation.2 The series of events caught the attention of Marcelo Freixo, 
Rio’s elected State Deputy, who personally escorted Campos to find support from the NGO 
Liberdade Religiosa (or “Religious Liberty”), which works to defend religious liberty rights 
and provide counseling to victims of religious intolerance.3 
 The physical and verbal attacks against Campos are highly representative of the type 
of violence and intolerance that many practitioners of Afro-Brazilian faiths, including 
                                                 
1 Bruce Douglas. "Attack on 11-year-old in Rio Highlights Fears of Rising Religious Intolerance." The 
Guardian. Guardian News and Media Limited, 19 June 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.;  
"Menina Vítima De Intolerância Religiosa Diz Que Vai Ser Difícil Esquecer Pedrada." Rio De Janeiro. Globo 
Comunicação E Participações S.A, 16 June 2015. Web. 14 Jan. 2016.  
2 Tiago Federico. "Menina Vítima De Intolerância Religiosa Diz Que Não Perdoa Agressores." O Dia. O Dia, 
17 June 2015. Web. 15 Nov. 2015 ; 
Leandro Resende. “'Por que não me respeitam?', indaga menina agredida por ser do Candomblé.”O Dia. O Dia, 
18 June 2015. Web. 15 Jan. 2015 
3 Ibid.  
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Candomblé, are currently experiencing all across Brazil and specifically in Rio de Janeiro. 
Regarding the physical attack, we cannot discern many details of the attacker’s profile. It is 
surmisable, however, that he is an evangelical Christian, possibly a Pentecostal or neo-
Pentecostal. There is little doubt that this attack was religiously motivated. Since the attacker 
was a stranger, it is likely that the mere symbol of Campos’ white robes and/or her presence 
at a terreiro, or temple, were enough to invoke hatred and violence. The attacker probably 
associated the victim’s faith with feitiçaria, or witchcraft, and possibly with devil-worship. 
None of these assumptions are currently verifiable. But these are not unreasonable 
assumptions, as I will demonstrate throughout this thesis. Namely, they are widely shared by 
many Brazilians, including government officials like Marcelo Freixo, who have consistently 
interpreted Campos’ enigmatic event as an intolerant evangelical attack on Afro-Brazilian 
religions.4 Evangelicals, especially Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, are seen as waging a 
war on the Afro-Brazilian religious community. 
Additionally, Brazilians, especially the victims of this violence, are increasingly 
speaking out that attacks against Afro-Brazilian religions are racially motivated. Available 
evidence suggests that the vast majority of victims in scenarios like Campos’ are of African 
descent,5 despite the fact that Afro-Brazilian religions are practiced by peoples of widely 
diverse backgrounds and skin colors, including whites.6 The question then becomes whether 
attackers, especially evangelical or Pentecostal attackers, are motivated by religious 
                                                 
4 The four sources cited in footnotes 1 and 2 support this.  
5And based on photographs from news articles, which is admittedly a problematic form of identifying skin color 
and especially race, this includes Campos and her grandmother. 
6 This needs more research. The media only discusses cases where the victims are of African descent, but a 
study is needed that looks at temples primarily housing ‘black’ worshippers and compares them with temples 
with many ‘white’ worshippers to see how much more frequently Afro-Brazilian groups are attacked. 
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intolerance and competition alone, or whether persecution of Afro-Brazilian religions is 
racist in nature.  
This thesis will explore how rapidly growing support for Pentecostalism relates to the 
increasing violence and intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religious groups. I seek to 
examine how and why some groups of militant Pentecostals are promoting and enacting 
violence. I also aim explore how race is a factor in this violence. These questions are 
especially pertinent as Pentecostalism gains momentum in the Global South, and as religious 
fervor more widely thrives in most regions of the world.  
The persistence of religion around the world surprises many scholars because it 
directly refutes the secularization thesis. As formulated by the founding “fathers” of 
sociology as well as anthropology (Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, Emile 
Durkheim; E.B. Tylor, James Frazer, Augustus Comte), secularization theory posited the 
decline of religion in modernity. Weber called this the disenchantment of the world. As 
industrialization accelerated, rationality and science would become seen as superior to faith. 
Religion, which Marx called “the opiate of the masses,” would lose force and currency. 
According to Giles Kepel, this theory has its origins in western Enlightenment thinking – 
reason, rationality, and science were considered ultimate embodiments of modernity and 
progress.7 With the tumult of the 1960s and the growth of individualized forms of 
spirituality, the decline of mainline religions, and the weakening of religious authority as a 
                                                 
7 Gilles Kepel. The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World, 
Penn State Press, 1994. 
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cohesive power in social life, many western scholars adopted this line of thinking and applied 
it to the world. 
In Public Religions in the Modern World, Jose Casanova explains that there are three 
prongs to modern secularization theory – differentiation (increased religious pluralism and 
reduced homogeneity), decline in belief (increasing numbers of non-religious or atheistic 
people), and privatization (religion operates in homes and religious institutions, not in the 
media or the government).8 Casanova does not refute that differentiation and even decline in 
belief are occurring world-wide and particularly in the West, and my case will not refute 
these either. However, his central thesis is that we are witnessing the “deprivatization” of 
religion in the modern world, meaning that there is a resurgence of religion in the public 
sphere:  
Religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal 
and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of 
secularization had reserved for them. Social movements have appeared which 
either are religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the 
legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the 
market economy. Similarly, religious institutions and organizations refuse to 
restrict themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls and continue to raise 
questions about the interconnections of private and public morality…. One of 
the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual, interrelated process of 
repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativization 
of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for lack of a 
better term, the “deprivatization” of religion.9 
In support of this line of thinking, Giles Gunn details the emergence of extreme forms 
of evangelical Christianity in the public sphere in the United States in his book, Ideas to Die 
For. His discussion of U.S. religious politics resonates rather strongly with the situation that I 
                                                 
8 José Casanova. Public Religions in the Modern World. University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
9 Ibid, 5-6.  
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am analyzing in Brazil. He asserts that the realms of the public and the popular have been 
asked “not only to work for religion but to do much of the work of religion.”10 He argues, 
“We have been told that evangelical Protestants, like charismatic Catholics and orthodox 
Jews… are adamantly opposed to the invasion of the precincts of belief by popular culture, 
but to judge from the way they live their faith, this could not be further off the mark.”11 
Furthermore, he writes that these individualistic characteristics gave rise to the encouraging 
of Americans to take refuge in the “politics of sin,” which offered believers an opportunity to 
use their faith to change the public realm into something more congenial with their beliefs.12 
One consequence of all of this, in Gunn’s eyes, is the frequent drawing of boundaries 
between “us” and “them” (with threats like immigrants, slaves, women, etc. being lumped in 
the “them” category). He explains, “The upright and the reprobate, the saved and the fallen… 
have been ‘rewritten as the boundaries between good and evil.’”13 In this paper, I will 
demonstrate the ways in which Gunn’s descriptions extend far beyond the American 
religious sphere by showing how extreme groups of Pentecostals are relying on the public 
sphere to undermine secularity and to spread messages of hate and war in Brazil and 
globally. Namely, I will attempt to answer why Afro-Brazilians have been propped up as the 
“other,” falling into Gunn’s “them” category in a narrative about good versus evil.  
This study will be much more exploratory than explanatory. Unfortunately, many of 
the attackers remain anonymous and we are left to guess at their motivations. While there is 
substantial anecdotal evidence of attacks on Afro-Brazilian communities, few official 
                                                 
10 Giles Gunn. Ideas to Die for: The Cosmopolitan Challenge (Routledge, 2013), 78. 
11 Ibid, 79.  
12 Ibid, 81.  
13 Ibid, 82.  
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statistics exist on the subject. Afro-Brazilian religious communities are understudied and 
underrepresented, as not all victims are as vocal and proud as Campos and her grandmother.  
However, the assumptions discussed around Kailane Campos’ case are built upon a 
series of more knowable, intolerant and violent events orchestrated by small groups of 
militant evangelicals and often more specifically neo-Pentecostals. I will illuminate the 
Pentecostal role in this violence with a fuller description of fervent groups’ presence in the 
Brazilian public sphere. By placing Campos’ attack in a larger context of violence and 
looking at the different reactions and perceptions of the groups involved, I will demonstrate 
how Pentecostals are blamed for the violence. I will show that some groups of Pentecostals, 
especially the neo-Pentecostal church network called the Universal Church of the Kingdom 
of God, are embracing a rhetoric of war that is likely contributing to rising violence. 
Furthermore, I will discuss an increasingly popular concept of “inside-out” tolerance, 
whereby some Pentecostal groups are speaking and acting out for the right to discriminate, to 
demonize, and to hate. Lastly, I will demonstrate that hate against Afro-Brazilian religions 
cannot be separated from hate against Africanness, implicating blackness to some degree.  
 With attention to the historical context and the present Brazilian religious landscape, 
this introduction seeks to give a general picture of the violence that the Afro-Brazilian 
religious community faces, emphasizing Rio de Janeiro as a site of study.  I will begin by 
describing Brazil’s changing religious landscape before defining the religious labels that will 
be used throughout this thesis. It is difficult to disentangle modern issues of persecution from 
the long, painful history of intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions, which is further 
difficult to disentangle from a history of institutionalized and later privatized racism. So, 
after characterizing the religious groups in question, I will give a brief history of Afro-
7 
 
Brazilian oppression. After, I will provide specific examples of the intolerance and violence 
perpetrated against Afro-Brazilian religions in Rio. Finally, I will end the introduction with a 
brief chapter outline and a description of my research methods. 
I. The Present Religious Landscape in Brazil 
Since the Portuguese colonized Brazil in the 16th century, Catholicism has enjoyed 
cultural, political, and demographic predominance. Today, an estimated 123 million Roman 
Catholics reside in Brazil – more than any other country in the world.14 However, the share 
of Brazil’s overall population that identifies as Catholic has been dropping steadily in recent 
decades, while the percentage of Brazilians who belong to Protestant churches (and 
especially Pentecostal denominations) has been rising. Smaller but consistently increasing 
shares of Brazilians also identify with other religions (including the Afro-Brazilian religions) 
or with no religion at all. 15  
A Pew Research Center study shows that the number of Brazilian Protestants grew in 
the most recent decade from 15% of the population in 2000 to 22% in 2010.16 Based on the 
2010 census, Pew states that 13% of all Brazilians, or 59% of the 42 million Brazilian 
                                                 
14 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. “Brazil’s Changing Religious Landscape.” Pew Research Centers 
Religion Public Life Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 18 July 2013. Web. 12 Mar. 2015 
15 "Religion in Latin America." Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 
12 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 Mar. 2015. 
 
16 “Protestant” is broadly defined here by the Pew Research Center to include Brazilians who identify with 
historically mainline and Evangelical Protestant denominations as well as those who belong to Pentecostal 
denominations, such as the Assemblies of God and the Foursquare Church. It also includes members of 
independent, neo-Pentecostal churches, such as the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and the God is 
Love Pentecostal Church, both of which were founded in Brazil. But in keeping with categories in the Brazilian 
census, it does not include Mormons or Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
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Protestants, identified as Pentecostal.17 An additional 34% of the total Brazilian population 
are considered Charismatics, meaning that they belong to mainline Protestant or Catholic 
churches but self-identify as Pentecostal or hold beliefs in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In my 
own direct analysis of the 2010 census, it appears that approximately 25 million Brazilians 
belong to “Evangelical churches of Pentecostal origin.”18 Pew explains that the growing 
numbers of Pentecostals and Protestants in general are largely due to religious switching, 
mostly due to Catholics converting.  
In addition, the number of Brazilians belonging to other religions – including “Afro-
Brazilian faiths” such as Candomblé and Umbanda, Spiritist movements, and global religions 
such as Buddhism and Islam – has been climbing. About 2 million Brazilians belonged to 
these other religions in 1970, and this number increased to about 6 million (4% of Brazil’s 
population) by 2000 and 10 million (5%) by 2010. The IBGE’s 2010 census lists nearly 3.9 
million Spiritists, 407,500 Umbanda adherents, nearly 168,000 Candomblé adherents, 14,000 
adherents to ‘other Afro-Brazilian religions,’ and 63,000 Brazilians who adhere to 
‘Indigenous Traditions.’19 Finally, the number of Brazilians with no religious affiliation, 
including agnostics and atheists, grew from fewer than 1 million Brazilians in 1970 to 12 
million (7%) in 2000, topping 15 million (8%) in Brazil’s 2010 census.20 Pew provides the 
charts given in figures 1 and 2 to demonstrate these trends. 
                                                 
17 More recently, in July of 2013, the U.S. government estimated that 60% of Brazilian Protestants identify as 
Pentecostal: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. "International Religious Freedom Report for 
2013." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web. 11 Mar. 2015. 
18 See Appendix A.  
19 See Appendix A.  
 
20 Religion in Latin America." Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 
12 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 Mar. 2015. 
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These numbers are not infallible as Brazilian religious identity tends to be much more 
fluid than in the United States and reporting is unreliable. Brazilians may change religions 
relatively often or have multiple religious labels for themselves. They also may be dishonest 
when taking surveys if their religion is stigmatized (Afro-Brazilian religions are probably 
radically underrepresented). Regardless, a quantitative analysis of the religious landscape at 
least sheds light on general trends of changing religious demographics.  
The decline in mainline religion and the increasing popularity of Pentecostalism as 
well as a smaller but still significant increasing popularity of Afro-Brazilian religions 
demonstrate that differentiation, or the first prong of the secularization thesis, is well-
supported. Very small increases in atheism also demonstrate that the second prong, or decline 
in belief, is gradually occurring. However, the growing trend towards evangelicalism is 
significant as Pentecostals are increasingly active in the public sphere. As will be illustrated, 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2. 
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the third prong of the secularization thesis, or privatization, is not only currently unfounded 
but is radically opposite of Pentecostal behavior and success.  
Lastly, to hone in on the site of Rio de Janeiro specifically, the city itself is more or 
less represented by the statistics above, and southeastern Brazil houses 18% of Brazil’s 
evangelicals and is an important center of evangelical expansion.21 As a global city many 
minorities are present and Rio is one of a few urban centers that houses larger groups of 
Afro-Brazilian faiths than other parts of the country, making it an epicenter for the 
intolerance and violence explored in my project and therefore a good case-study site.   
II Clarification of Terms 
Characterizing Pentecostalism 
Pentecostalism is arguably the fastest growing religious movement in the contemporary 
world. Globally, it has experienced exceptional growth from its modest beginnings with a 
handful of followers at the beginning of the twentieth century to some half billion adherents at 
the end of the century. In To the Ends of the Earth: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of 
World Christianity, Allan Anderson explains that perhaps the most important reason for this 
expansion is that Pentecostalism is fundamentally an ““ends of the earth,” missionary, 
polycentric, transnational religion.”22 Pentecostalism encompasses non-Catholic (Protestant) 
Christian churches and worshippers that emphasize the experience of the Spirit or Gifts of the 
Holy Spirit (such as divine healing, speaking in tongues, or direct revelations from God) as 
                                                 
21 Ricardo Mariano. "Expansão Pentecostal no Brasil: O Caso da Igreja Universal."Estudos avançados 18.52 
(2004), 121-138. 
22 Allan Anderson. To the Ends of the Earth: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of World Christianity 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.  
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well as a belief in world evangelization. Pentecostal denominations value spreading the gospel 
and serving as witnesses for Jesus Christ in the farthest reaches of the globe, which is largely 
responsible for the success of Pentecostalism worldwide.  
Because the terms Pentecostal and evangelical are often used interchangeably, a 
clarification of their distinctions is in order for this paper. The terms have overlapping 
definitions, but the former is more specific than the latter. Like some other Protestant 
denominations (including many evangelicals), Pentecostalism emphasizes conversion, moral 
rigor, and a literal interpretation of the bible, but what makes Pentecostalism unique is its belief 
that all Christians should seek a post-conversion religious experience called the baptism with 
the Holy Spirit. This second baptism (also called adult baptism) is characterized by glossalia, 
in which the newly baptized ‘speak in tongues.’ This practice refers to the biblical story of 
Pentecost (Acts 1:2), when “the apostles spoke to people from different parts of the ancient 
Middle East, to each in his own tongue, although the apostles had never learned those 
languages.”23 Modern Pentecostals do not speak in a human language previously unknown to 
them, but they do emit a series of sounds claimed to be part of a ‘divine’ language only 
understood by God. Pentecostals believe that those baptized by the Holy Spirit may receive 
other supernatural gifts like the ability to prophesy, to heal, or to interpret speaking in 
tongues.24 
Relatedly, evangelical groups “stress the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ, 
conversion, Scripture as the sole basis for faith, and active evangelism (the winning of personal 
                                                 
23 Kepel, The Revenge of God, 114. 
24  Allen Anderson, To The Ends of the Earth ;  
John G. Melton. "Pentecostalism." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, 31 Aug. 2014. 
Web. 14 Mar. 2015.  
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commitments to Christ).”25 However, evangelicals may or may not believe in the second 
baptism or practice glossalia and can belong to nearly any Christian denomination, as 
evangelism is emphasized in numerous sects of Christianity. Thus, while most Pentecostals are 
evangelicals, many evangelicals are not Pentecostals.26 
While this paper will attempt to focus specifically on Pentecostalism, it is important to 
note some variations in the way the label is used. For instance, in a 2006 report by the Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, Pentecostals have been separated from Charismatics (who 
also hold some Pentecostal beliefs or who self-identify as Pentecostal but do not belong to 
official denominations labeled as Pentecostal – for example, some Charismatics are mainline 
Protestants or Catholics), and then reclassified together to make up a group called 
“Renewalists.”27 Members belonging to Pentecostal denominations make up substantial 
portions of the populations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, but when the scope is 
widened to the larger category of Renewalists, we see demographic numbers double or triple 
(15% of Brazilians are considered Pentecostal, plus 34% Charismatics, totaling 49% of 
Brazil’s population for Renewalists). This demonstrates that how we define Pentecostalism has 
implications for how large the movement is.28 
                                                 
25 John G. Melton "Evangelical church - Protestantism." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia 
Britannica, n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2015. 
 
26 Also, because evangelical is somewhat of an umbrella term and does not refer to a specific denomination, I 
will not capitalize the term in this paper, though it I have found the term written both ways all across my 
research. 
 
27 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. "Spirit and Power – A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals." Pew 
Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 04 Oct. 2006. Web. 03 Mar. 2015. 
  
28 To contrast with Pew’s terminology, statistics regarding Renewalist churches in Brazil refer only to those 
historical protestant churches who either converted to Pentecostalism or became off-shoots of the historical 
church and added “Renewalist” to their official names as a way of indicating their beliefs in Pentecostalism.  
Additionally, when the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) records its census data on 
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Lastly, and crucially, most religious scholars make a distinction between 
Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism. The former can be all-encompassing for summary 
purposes, but when used in contrast with neo-Pentecostalism it becomes more specific. It 
generally describes the movement up through the 1960s and also refers to a culture of small 
chapels that persists today. The latter refers to the newest wave of the religion, beginning in 
roughly the 1970s, that emphasizes “a much more centralized organization superficially 
comparable in its pyramidal structure to that of the Catholic Church.”29 It is characterized by 
“monumental buildings in central locations [and] an ambition to become prominent social 
institutions.”30 Neo-Pentecostalism is also characterized by the use of business management 
techniques in running churches, a greater emphasis on the theology of prosperity, and the use 
of the media for the work of mass proselytism and religious advertising (leading to the name 
'electronic churches’).31 In the Brazilian context, it has also been largely associated with having 
political influence and charismatic leaders, as well as appealing to less-educated Brazilian 
masses.32 Further regarding this movement in Brazil, Vagner Gonçalves da Silva of the 
University of São Paulo argues that “the centrality of the theology of the spiritual battle against 
other religious denominations, especially the Afro-Brazilian religions and Spiritism,” also 
characterizes neo-Pentecostalism.33 My field research will support this description.  
                                                 
religion, it breaks evangelicals into subheadings of “missionary Evangelicals” (which I surmise to mean non-
Pentecostal evangelicals) and “Evangelicals of Pentecostal origins” (see Appendix A). 
 
29 Patricia Birman and David Lehmann. "Religion and the Media in a Battle for Ideological Hegemony: the 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 18.2, 
(1999, 145-164), 2. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Vagner Gonçalves da Silva. Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on 
Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil. Mana, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 3, Selected 
Edition, 2007. Web. 
32 Paul Freston. “"Neo-pentecostalism" in Brazil: Problems of Definition and the Struggle for Hegemony.” 
Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 44.105 (1999), 145–162. Web. 
33 Gonçalves da Silva. Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions. 
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For the purposes of this paper, I will sometimes use the more inclusive “Pentecostal” to 
refer to the religious groups in question when describing larger trends, but I will also often 
switch to discussing neo-Pentecostalism because of its stronger association with intolerance 
and because of my focus on the neo-Pentecostal church, the Universal Church of the Kingdom 
of God.34 I will also occasionally widen the scope to the broader category of evangelicals in 
order to reflect on global trends and behaviors, especially because evangelicals are more 
widely referred to in media articles about Brazilian religious events and trends.35 
Characterizing Afro-Brazilian Religions 
Brazil has a few distinct but overlapping religions that were created or molded 
domestically but that have fascinating and diverse global origins: Candomblé, 
Spiritism/Kardecism, and Umbanda. Candomblé and Umbanda have roots in African 
traditions and a substantial amount of Afro-Brazilian followers, so they are often lumped 
together in literature and by government agencies like the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics or the U.S. State Department as “Afro-Brazilian religions” or “Afro-Brazilian 
cults.” Labeling the religions as “Afro-Brazilian” is a little misleading as both Candomblé 
and Umbanda also have numerous white followers and followers of mixed or other races (see 
                                                 
34 That is not to say that traditional Pentecostalism has not been associated with intolerance against Afro-
Brazilian religions. Here I am generalizing descriptions of religious labels to maintain some measure of brevity. 
The categories are not mutually exclusive, as many of the characteristics listed describe both groups in varying 
degrees. For a much more thorough discussion and critique on the varied and complex typologies of 
Pentecostalism and Protestantism more generally, see:  
Paul Freston. “"Neo-pentecostalism" in Brazil: Problems of Definition and the Struggle for Hegemony.”  
35 There are also discrepancies when it comes to reporting on religious groups. For example, the Pew survey 
categories are based on survey responses of different Christians in multiple countries around the world, where 
surveyors labeled respondents at their discretion. Relatedly, Brazilians’ religious identities are fluid – Brazilians 
tend to switch religions or convert much more often than is standard in the United States, and they may have 
multiple religious labels for themselves. These complicated uses of labels beseech the issue that religious data is 
only as reliable as the self-identifications of worshippers, the categories and labels prescribed by researchers, 
and data provided by churches and religious organizations.   
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Chapter 2 & Appendix B for racial demographics). But, despite complex and changing racial 
demographics, the religions maintain a strong connection to black Brazilian identity. I will 
maintain this label as it is widely used in the academic community.36  
Candomblé is a syncretic religion composed of oral traditions with roots in the 
Yoruba, Fon, and Bantu animist religions that were brought to Brazil by African slaves in the 
17th through the 19th centuries. The first official Candomblé temples of worship, which were 
dedicated to Yoruba gods and goddesses, were established in early nineteenth-century 
Bahia.37 Slaves incorporated elements of Catholicism into their traditions, largely in order to 
feign conversion to Catholicism in front of Portuguese masters and observers, so there are 
many elements of Catholicism in modern Candomblé rituals. Candomblé has one supreme 
god called Olodumaré,38 but it is also the religion of the orixás (“orishas” in English), or 
ancestral spirit deities. The orixás have secondary identities as Catholic saints (for many 
worshippers, the Catholic saint names are superficial, but for many others, the deities and the 
saints have conceptually merged into one being). Unlike Catholicism, however, Candomblé 
is more focused on a relationship with the environment, the community, and the orixás than 
with providing strict guidelines for living a moral life. So there are not rules dictating one’s 
marriage life or sexual orientation, for example. Perhaps the most controversial element of 
Candomblé is that many terreiros, or temples, still practice animal sacrifice using 
                                                 
36 I am not, however, inclined to use term ‘cult’ because I suspect that it stems from a historic tendency to de-
legitimize Afro-Brazilian religions by labeling them as something other than religion (‘superstition’ and 
‘witchcraft’ also fall into this trap).  
 
37 Robert A Voeks. Sacred Leaves of Candomblé: African Magic, Medicine, and Religion in Brazil (University 
of Texas Press, 1997), 51. 
 
38 Here, ‘god’ is not capitalized because Brazilians call Olodumaré an orixá (a word meaning a god or deity that 
is not usually capitalized) or they call him by his name. He is not called ‘Deus’ (meaning ‘God’) in the same 
way that the monotheistic God of Christianity is called ‘Deus.’ 
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domesticated animals like chickens, where the blood and entrails are offered to the gods and 
the rest of the animal can be cooked to eat. It should be noted that Candomblé is also referred 
to pejoratively as Macumba, which does not have an English translation but has an 
association with devil-worship. Strangely, while this term has largely been used to demonize 
Candomblecistas, it has also been embraced or accepted by some Brazilian anthropologists as 
synonymous with Candomblé, so the term often comes up in research on the subject.39 
Spiritism (espiritismo), was not created in Brazil in the same way as Candomblé, but 
it has certainly been molded there. Also called Kardecism (Kardecismo) because it was 
developed by a French man who adopted the last name Kardec, Spiritism draws on 
reincarnation but also on Christianity. Spiritists emphasize God as the principle of everything 
and believe that God presides over a material world and a spirit world. Spirits can come and 
go as they please through these worlds, and humans can communicate with them through a 
medium. Spiritism is still largely practiced in Brazil, but additionally, much of its modern 
realization is through its influences on Umbanda, as Brazilian Spiritists founded Umbanda. 
Spiritism is also a bit less “Afro-Brazilian” than Candomblé and Umbanda, as its European 
origins made it more popular with whites upon its introduction to Brazil in the 19th century.40 
                                                 
39 In this section I give a generalized description of Candomblé (and also later of Umbanda). For more on the 
rich history of its origins, creation and spread throughout Brazil, as well as modern variants (the term 
Candomblé refers to the mainstream version of the religion which derives most of its influence from Yoruba 
traditions, but there are still branches that take on different names and maintain traditions from different regions 
in Africa), see: 
Nei Lopez. “African Religions in Brazil, Negotiation, and Resistance: A Look from Within.” Journal of Black 
Studies 34.6 (2004). Sage Publications, Inc.: 838–60.  
40 It is interesting to note that we hear little or nothing about Spiritism or Kardecism, which originated in 
Europe, in the United States. Based on my knowledge of Brazilian and American culture and history, I wonder 
if this might be correlated with the fact that Brazilian culture has a legacy of embracing magic and mysticism 
much more than American culture. 
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Nonetheless, modern variants of Spiritism are encompassed by the “Afro-Brazilian religions” 
label when used by Brazilian media and academic sources.  
Umbanda shares many similarities with Candomblé and it is often considered 
Candomblé’s indigenous counterpart. It was founded in the early 1920’s and 30’s and is 
basically a mixture of Candomblé, Spiritism/Kardecism, and indigenous Brazilian beliefs and 
practices, including emphasis on worshipping and communicating with animal spirits.41 
Umbanda was founded by Spiritists who sought out Afro-Brazilian rituals in order to add 
excitement and emotion to their practices, so they drew on elements of Candomblé. This is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘blackening’ of Kardecism.42 Later, indigenous spirits called 
Caboclos43 were incorporated into ceremonies. Thus, Umbanda became a religion of all three 
of Brazil’s dominant or largest races – whites, blacks, and indigenous peoples. Like 
Candomblé and Spiritism, Umbanda rituals include conversing with the dead, although the 
religion does not emphasize spirit possession in the same way that Candomblé does. 
Umbanda also places a greater emphasis on medicine and healing. Modernly, there are sects 
of Umbanda that tend to minimize African traditions and are mostly adhered to by white 
practitioners, and there are sects that embrace African traditions and tend to have more black 
practitioners.  
III. A Historical Legacy of Persecution 
                                                 
41 Steven Engler. "Umbanda and Hybridity." Numen 56.5 (2009), 555.  
42 Ibid, 557. 
 
43 Unlike ‘orixá,’ ‘Caboclo’ is usually capitalized in Brazilian literature, perhaps because it is a name for a 
specific group of spirits – the spirits of indigenous peoples.  
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  The history of the Afro-Brazilian religions, particularly of Candomblé, cannot be 
untangled from the history of race relations in Brazil. Traditionally, persecution against Afro-
Brazilian religions has been tantamount to racism. African traditions have been mistreated 
since the first African slaves arrived in Brazil and were forced to convert to Catholicism, the 
official religion of the Brazilian colony under the Portuguese. This persecution led to the 
creation of syncretic religions like Candomblé (African slaves masked their traditions under 
Catholic ones to remain undetected). Many scholars of Afro-Brazilian history attribute the 
historical oppression of black roots to the slave masters’ fear of slave rebellions and 
insurrections, and later to fear of the diminution of the slave masters’ status and privilege.44  
 The Portuguese monarchy in Brazil abolished the slave trade in 1850, although the 
legality of owning slaves was maintained into the 1870s and 1880s. As more and more 
Africans and Afro-Brazilians were ‘freed,’ no allowance was made for projects to absorb this 
labor force or compensate them. Many died outside the properties of their former masters, as 
there was no shelter for them in the cities. The result of the “cautious and unsympathetic 
liberation” was that uneducated ex-slaves were thrown into competition with immigrant labor 
flowing into Brazil from the 1970’s onward.45 When Princess Isabel finally abolished slavery 
in 1888 (note how late this date is in comparison with the rest of the New World), abolition 
was not the culmination of a struggle for liberty but rather a slow and procedural process 
                                                 
44 The oppression of black roots and related creation of syncretic religions in Brazil parallels the creation of 
voodoo in the Caribbean and the United States and related African syncretic religions throughout the New 
World.  
 
45 Lilia Moritz Schwarcz. "Not Black, Not White: Just the Opposite. Culture, Race and National Identity in 
Brazil." Center for Brazilian Studies (2003): 7. University of Oxford. Web. 14 Jan. 2016. 
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enacted by the government, resulting in a sort of “passivity and resignation” regarding black 
disadvantage.46   
Throughout this time period and particularly toward the end of the nineteenth century, 
white Brazilian intellectuals increasingly found inspiration in the prejudicial ideas of 
naturalists like French novelist Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau. Gobineau’s book, An 
Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853), is often considered the first example of 
scientific racism, and it convinced many whites that their race was inherently biologically 
superior to blacks. Gobineau reproved of biological and cultural crossbreeding, mixed 
customs, and adulterated religions. In his legacy, Brazilian scientists began supporting 
phrenology, physicians proposed eugenics and condemned mixed marriages, and lawyers 
pushed to restrict Africans from migrating into the country and even suggested a separate 
penal code for blacks.47 Blacks were seen as subhuman second-class citizens by many. 
Relatedly, any religious beliefs associated with slaves, and thus with African roots and 
blackness, were persecuted socially and legally.  
Afro-Brazilian studies scholar Nei Lopes outlines how this persecution played out 
against Candomblé in the former federal capital of Rio de Janeiro. Lopes explains that as the 
twentieth century dawned, a series of "civilizing" campaigns were unleashed in the former 
capital to address the urgent imperative of hygiene: 
Religious practices of African origin were considered pollutant and 
antihygienic and were harshly repressed, repeating what had happened in 1829, 
when the Accu Candomble [a terreiro] was violently overrun by police 
repression. There was invasion and confiscation of liturgical objects and other 
property. The population rejected this incident legally by making representation 
to the provincial government. In 1927, a police commission was created in Rio 
                                                 
46 Ibid, 9. 
47 Ibid, 10. 
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de Janeiro to repress what was called "low spiritism." In 1934, repression was 
intensified with a special police precinct for that issue. And in 1937, within this 
precinct, a Department of Drugs and Mystifications was created specifically to 
combat religious practices considered criminal. It was in response to these 
actions that, in 1934 and 1937, Afro-Brazilian Congresses were held in Recife 
and Salvador.48 
During this time, the inauguration of Brazilian President/dictator Getulio Vargas 
sparked a long-overdue reduction in the legal persecution of Afro-Brazilian religions. With 
encouragement from outspoken Candomblé leaders and the Afro-Brazilian Congresses, 
Vargas decriminalized African religions with Presidential Decree No. 1202 in 1938.49 
However, he also re-imposed Catholicism as the official religion of the country. 
In this same era came a change in the way that Brazilians conceptualized 
miscegenation. Brazilian Anthropology Professor Lilia Schwarcz explains, “Only in the 
1930s does miscegenation transform itself from being Brazil’s supreme disgrace into being 
its sublime defining characteristic.”50 Schwarcz refers primarily to a classic book written by 
Brazilian author Gilberto Freyre as a key catalyst for this change. Freyre’s famous piece 
Casa-Grande e Senzala (or Slave Masters and Slaves) painted an idealized portrait of 
Brazilian slavery, one of paternalistic masters and faithful slaves. For Freyre, the Portuguese 
were tolerant and capable of syncretizing cultures, and cross-breeding was an acceptable 
model of civilization. Brazilian history was a history of sexual intercourse of the three 
formative cultures that produced cultural enrichment and racial harmony.  
This rhetoric slowly worked its way into mainstream culture and politics. The 
national identity of Brazilians became tied to mixed-race, Samba, Capoeira, and other 
                                                 
48 Lopez. “African Religions in Brazil.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Schwarcz, "Not Black, Not White,” 12.  
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symbols of Africanness and miscegenation. The creation and spread of Umbanda in the 
1920s and 1930s marked another symbolic mixing of Brazil’s three seminal cultures, as 
European Spiritism mixed with Candomblé and indigenous traditions. Afro-Brazilian 
religions were adopted by small but significant groups of whites, and religious demographics 
became increasingly diverse.  
Freyre laid the groundwork for what would later come to be known as Brazil’s “myth 
of racial democracy,” a myth that is still maintained today. This was cemented in the 1950s, 
when, based on the fact that Brazil had no open racial conflicts, a couple of UNESCO-
sponsored studies painted Brazil as a racially-harmonious model for other societies to 
follow.51 Brazilians began to see racism as a thing of the past, if it had every truly existed at 
all. For followers of Freyre, racial discrimination was mild and largely irrelevant, and 
discrimination within the Brazilian social hierarchy was targeted at class, rather than race.52 
Many citizens began to argue that racial distinctions had faded because national identity was 
tied to mixed-race. Supposedly everyone could be harmoniously encompassed under the 
mixed-race category.  
But while the official depiction of race relations and national identity had changed 
drastically from the nineteenth century, inequality and prejudice prevailed on the ground. 
Schwarcz writes: 
The Brazilian tendency would be to continue to discriminate, despite 
considering such an attitude outrageous for the sufferer and degrading for the 
practitioner… It is as if the Brazilians repeated the past in the present, but 
                                                 
51 While at present many Brazilians still feel that a lack of open conflicts or segregation laws means that Brazil 
has always had less racism than the United States, many scholars alternatively argue that precisely because 
there were no open racial conflicts, Brazilian society never really dealt with its racism (supposedly in contrast 
with the Jim Crow era in the U.S. and the subsequent Civil Rights Movement).  
 
52 Edward E Telles. Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton University 
Press, 2014), 7. 
22 
 
translated it into the private sphere. The abolition of slavery, with rights under 
law and the right to work becoming universal, was not to affect the traditional 
pattern of racial accommodation; on the contrary, it would serve only to 
camouflage it.53 
Substantial work has been done on modern race relations in Brazil, and the general 
position in the academic community is that the myth of racial democracy is still a myth. 
Sociologist Edward Telles dispels the myth in his work Race in Another America: The 
Significance of Skin Color in Brazil, in which he examines modern racial miscegenation and 
inequality. He shows that high rates of racial intermarriage and residential proximity do not 
actually translate into the full inclusion of blacks into Brazilian economic and political life.54 
In fact, Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately poorer and face “a discriminatory glass 
ceiling,” where upward mobility is concerned.55 And, Telles explains, social development, 
including education and quality of healthcare, coincides with racial composition, where the 
racially darker Northeast has poorer development than the predominantly white Southeast.56 
Citing Telles’ and other influential works, John Burdick states, “In Brazil, in general, the 
lighter one’s skin and the straighter one’s hair, the higher one’s status ; the darker one’s skin 
and the more tightly curled one’s hair, the lower one’s status.”57 Despite these issues 
affecting everyday realities on the ground, Brazilian culture still embraces the sentiment of 
equality. The mulatto remains a quintessential symbol of national identity, and miscegenation 
remains a popular ideology. 
                                                 
53 Ibid, 18.  
54 Melissa Nobles. Review of Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil. American 
Journal of Sociology 110 (6). University of Chicago Press (2005), 1805–7. doi:10.1086/432381. 
55 Ibid, 1806.  
56 Telles, Race in Another America, 20.  
57 John Burdick. "Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing in Brazil?." Journal of Latin American 
Studies 37, no. 02 (2005), 311. 
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Currently, many of the Afro-Brazilian activist groups engaging problems of racial 
inequalities and practices are religious. Relatedly, the black consciousness movement affirms 
ethnic and racial identity based on African-derived religions such as Candomblé.58 This will 
be described further in Chapter 2 when I explore the role of race in modern violence against 
Afro-Brazilian religions.  
IV. Afro-Brazilians Under Attack in Rio 
Centuries of violence and intolerance against African-derived religions transitioned 
into a few decades of relative tolerance beginning in the late-twentieth-century. Apart from 
modern issues surrounding neo-Pentecostalism, Patricia Birman and David Lehmann 
describe Brazil as “a country noted for religious tolerance, for a history of multiple and 
multi-levelled symbolic and political exchanges between different religious traditions, 
Catholic, ‘African’ and indigenous.”59 This description glosses over the violence and 
institutionalized intolerance that were directed toward Afro-Brazilian practices in the past, 
but it more or less describes Brazil at the end of the 20th century. And as the Catholic Church 
in Brazil grows increasingly progressive, many see it as relatively harmless to Afro-Brazilian 
religions. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution guarantees religious freedom to all religious 
groups and the Brazilian government has continued promoting tolerance since then .60 In July 
of 2015, the Racial Equality Act was signed into law and for the first time explicitly provides 
                                                 
58 Stephen L. Selka. “Ethnoreligious Identity Politics in Bahia, Brazil”. Latin American Perspectives 32 (1). 
Sage Publications, Inc. (2005): 72.  
59 Birman and Lehmann. "Religion and the Media in a Battle,” 1.  
 
60 An annotated English translation of the Brazilian Constitution can be found at: 
Comparative Constitutions Project. Brazil's Constitution of 1988 with Amendments through 2014. Constitute. 
University of Texas, Austin, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 16 Feb. 2016.  
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for the right to practice religions of African origin.61 Additionally, members of religions of 
African origin are granted access to religious professionals in hospitals, prisons, and other 
institutions.62  
That violence and intolerance have increased again, along with a decline in 
Catholicism and a steep rise in the popularity of Pentecostalism, threatens to undo the 
commendable progress that has been made in the realm of religious tolerance. Hundreds of 
attacks on the Afro-Brazilian religious community have occurred in Brazil in recent years, 
sometimes anonymous, but often directly linked to evangelicals. This specifically connects to 
neo-Pentecostals; Vagnar Gonçalves da Silva cites examples of neo-Pentecostal “armies of 
Christ” being urged to take to the streets and disrupt Afro-Brazilian rituals or to try to close 
down terreiros.63 Other tactics range from propaganda blitzkriegs launched on blogs and 
YouTube videos to threats, violence and expulsions from drug gangs. Rio de Janeiro seems 
to be one of a few epicenters of this violence.  
For example, a Candomblé center north of Rio de Janeiro run by priestess Maria de 
Conceição, 53, has been attacked eight times in recent years. In June of 2014, the center’s 
upper floor was set on fire and destroyed. Previously, attackers fired shots at her terreiro and 
her nearby house, and set fire to her car.64 Similar to Kailane Campos’s situation, no one has 
been arrested for de Conceição’s attacks, but de Conceição, Brazilian and American media 
                                                 
61 This is law # 12.228. Note the safeguarding of Afro-Brazilian religion under an act explicitly concerned with 
racial equality. The government sees the association between African traditions and modern race relations. This 
is one of many examples to come that portrays the strong ties between race and the Afro-Brazilian religions. 
 
62 Michael Anthony. "Brazil." (n.d.): n. pag. State.gov. U.S. Department of State. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.  
63 Gonçalves da Silva, Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions. 
64 Phillips, "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle.” 
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reporting on the issue, and Rio’s Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance (CCIR) all 
believe that these attacks are committed by evangelicals.  
 While much of the violence is committed anonymously, extremist evangelical leaders 
have publically verbalized their passionate disdain for Afro-Brazilian religious traditions, and 
in some cases this coincides or even leads to worshippers committing violence. “We can’t 
fully explain why religious intolerance is increasing, but one indicator is that some neo-
Pentecostal churches have been preaching hatred in the pews and on the Web,” said Carlos 
Alberto de Souza, watchdog for the Department for Policies to Promote Racial Equality.65  
Evangelical Pastor Tupirani Lores, 48, grew up in central Rio in a family that 
participated in Afro-Brazilian religions, but he converted to evangelical Christianity in his 
early 20’s. Lores opened his own Generation Jesus Christ church, and he has reportedly said 
that Afro-religions in Brazil are satanic. 66 In 2008, four members of his congregation, likely 
motivated by Lores, entered an Umbanda center in central Rio and smashed statues and idols. 
In 2009, Lores and Afonso Lobato, one of those involved in the incident, were jailed for 18 
days for religious discrimination after attacking Afro-Brazilian and other religions on blogs 
and videos posted to YouTube. In one video, Lobato said Afro-Brazilian religions were the 
devil’s work and that their leaders were homosexuals (pointing out sexual orientation as 
another target for evangelical intolerance).67 
                                                 
65 Learsi De Veneta. "Brazil Tries to Combat Religious Intolerance of Minority Faiths - OnFaith." OnFaith. 
N.p., 10 Oct. 2013. Web. 02 Dec. 2015.  
66 Phillips, "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle.” 
67 Ibid. 
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 Last year, Rio prosecutors launched a civil action to require Google to remove 
seventeen specific videos attacking Afro-Brazilian religions from YouTube. A federal judge 
ruled against them, writing that Afro-Brazilian religions could not be considered true 
religions because they lack a written text, a hierarchical structure and a God, basically 
limiting the definition of religion to monotheistic religion. Unfortunately, intolerance is not 
limited to the religious or private sphere, but it is also expounded in the public sphere by 
elected members of the Brazilian government. Ivanir dos Santos, president of Rio’s 
Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance has reportedly stated, “If you turn to the 
courts, which can be the arbiter of such situations, it can keep this from happening, in order 
to safeguard the constitution, and that the magistrate ends up expressing an opinion similar to 
those who preach hatred is unacceptable.”68  Fortunately, a higher court reversed this ruling, 
pointedly referring to “religions from the African matrix” and ordering the videos removed. 
Google is reportedly appealing the ruling in support of free speech.69 While this issue is 
certainly complicated, as freedom of speech laws are invaluable and should not be 
undermined, Brazil already has laws in place that make public displays of racism and anti-
Semitism illegal (including publishing books and videos exhibiting hate speech), so it is 
inconsistent to struggle with whether or not to ban videos preaching hatred towards Afro-
Brazilian religions.70 
 In addition to physical attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions’ congregations and 
property, as well as hate speech spread by religious leaders on the internet, there is also the 
issue of intimidation and religious intolerance as a means of monitoring populations in poor 
                                                 
68 My translation from Portuguese. Quoted from: De Veneta, "Brazil Tries to Combat Religious Intolerance.” 
69 Phillips, "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle.” 
70 Anthony, "Brazil." U.S. Department of State.  
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areas. Evangelical Christianity is becoming increasingly popular in favelas, or Brazilian 
slums, and evangelical churches have even spread faster in favelas than in other areas. This is 
often viewed positively, as the evangelical churches provide moral guidelines for favela-
dwellers, discouraging drug use and violence, and offering community resources. However, 
these churches tend to look negatively upon Afro-Brazilian religions. At times, the church 
leaders themselves speak out against Candomblé and Umbanda, but it is more often the 
overlords of the favelas (drug traffickers) that forbid the practice of Afro-Brazilian religions 
with the threat of violence against those who disobey. It is necessary to point out that 
Brazilian slums are disproportionately inhabited by black and mixed-race Brazilians, and 
Afro-Brazilian religions have traditionally found favelas to be safe havens at times when the 
rest of society was much less accepting. Adailton Moreira, a pai do santo (father of saint, or 
priest) and a member of Rio’s Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance, said 
Candomblé priests and centers have been expelled from many Rio favelas by drug gangs 
influenced by radical evangelical Christians, whose churches have proliferated in these areas. 
Moreira commented, “Racism is intrinsically holding hands with religious intolerance.”71  
Moreira’s comment brings us back to the question of race. What actually explains the 
increasing persecution of Afro-Brazilian religions? What role does race play in this tension? 
As I will argue in Chapter 2, race is an important factor in these conflicts, and unfortunately, 
it is often overlooked or dismissed.  
V. Organization of Chapters 
                                                 
71 Ibid.  
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Chapter 1 of this thesis will set up the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God as a 
case study for Pentecostal extremism and intolerance. I will discuss the ways in which 
Pentecostals are being accused of attacking Afro-Brazilian religions before introducing the 
Universal Church as a prime example of the accused. I will demonstrate the way that church 
leadership has used the public sphere to demonize Afro-Brazilian religions. I will detail my 
research in Rio de Janeiro with specific attention to my observations and participation in 
Universal Church sermons and rituals, and I will demonstrate how the Universal Church 
promotes narratives of war and battle, posing this as a key factor correlated with intolerance. 
Crucially, I will argue that the Universal Church is one of many groups that has begun to 
fight for the right to discriminate, positioning itself as the true victim when it is restricted 
from promoting hate or criticized for doing so. This relatively new dialogue about tolerance 
turned inside-out poses the attackers as the victims, drawing attention away from those who 
are truly being persecuted. 
 The second chapter of this thesis will attempt to explain the motivations behind 
evangelical and specifically neo-Pentecostal attacks on Afro-Brazilians. Religious 
competition as well as genuine morality clashes are at play, but racial elements must also be 
taken into account. The role of race is difficult to pinpoint, as racial demographic statistics 
are unreliable and the religious groups in question are racially mixed. However, the physical 
and discursive violence aimed at African traditions and practitioners of these traditions very 
much resemble the historical racism that Afro-Brazilians have experienced since their forced 
immigration to Brazil. I argue that the interpretations that the attacks are racist are not 
unreasonable and cannot be dismissed. Finally, I will briefly examine some parallel issues of 
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tension and violence in Africa to show the ways in which Pentecostals have provoked 
legitimate accusations of racism there as well. 
VI. Research Methods 
 In this project I ask open-ended questions and employ mostly qualitative research 
methods. All of my data is taken from public events, figures, publications, videos, and 
statements made on social media. To embark on gathering primary source material, I visited 
Rio de Janeiro for five weeks in July of 2015. I visited a couple of small, traditional 
Pentecostal churches in Rio, and I also attended two-hour sermons as an observer and a 
participant at Universal Church of the Kingdom of God locations in Rio. I visited a three 
separate UCKG churches in two different neighborhoods – Copacabana and Botafogo – on 
ten occasions. This is certainly a limited sample, but my descriptions of my experiences in 
Chapter 1 resonate strongly with outside source descriptions and online videos of UCKG 
sermons. During my stay in Rio, I also collected local newspapers and attended a public 
forum for religious freedom, and I use media coverage of the public forum to supplement my 
description of it in Chapter 1.  
 Apart from analyzing the events and sources gathered during my research trip, I 
employ a large amount of media analysis and event description. I also analyze publications 
from the Brazilian and U.S. governments (including census statistics), and I look at 
Instagram, Youtube, and Facebook pictures, videos, and comments surrounding Pentecostal 
attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions and perceptions of the groups involved.  
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Chapter 1 
The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: 
A Case Study 
 The debates around Kailane Campos’ and similar attacks, and subsequent marches 
and rallies speaking out for religious tolerance set the stage for the religious scene in Rio de 
Janeiro when I arrived in July of 2015. My observations during my five-week-long research 
trip will inform this chapter, which seeks to describe reactions to violence against Afro-
Brazilian traditions in Rio De Janeiro before delving into a detailed discussion on the church 
most accused of intolerance: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.  
The UCKG is the center of attention in conversations about evangelical intolerance. It 
is perhaps guiltier than any other large-scale Pentecostal church of promoting hate, as I will 
illustrate. It has been militarizing in some ways, and it disguises its intolerance in an 
enemy/war discourse, with African traditions (along with many other groups) as its target. It 
is also leading a conversation about what I call “inside-out” tolerance, where Pentecostal 
groups are argued to be discriminated against for their discrimination. Each of these 
behaviors contributes to a climate of war and hate directed at African traditions.  
1.1 Pentecostalism Accused 
 Rio de Janeiro’s Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance (CCIR) is urging 
people to take legal action against perpetrators who commit crimes of intolerance. The CCIR 
has campaigned for religious tolerance (in relation to Afro-Brazilian faiths, but also to other 
minority groups like Muslims and members of the Bah’ai community) all around the city, 
leading marches and protests as well as public forums.  
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 One particularly active promoter of public forums is the previously mentioned 
Marcelo Freixo, who is a Rio state deputy from the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade 
(Socialism and Liberty Party, or PSOL). In addition to his role as deputy, Freixo is the 
current president of the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights and Citizenship, 
housed under the State of Rio’s Legislative Assembly. In August of 2015, during my stay in 
Rio, Freixo’s Commission held a public audience for a discussion on religious intolerance 
and the ways in which it undermines democracy, and approximately 600-700 people 
attended.1 During the public audience, politicians, a police chief, religious leaders, and 
victims like Kailane Campos and her grandmother spoke about the 532 cases of religious 
intolerance that occurred in the past year, 70% of which involved Afro-Brazilian religions. In 
response to the climbing cases of religious intolerance, Freixo declared that he would ask the 
president of the Legislative Assembly to enact a new law to create a delegation to combat 
racial and intolerance crimes.2 Throughout the event there was an overwhelming outcry of 
support for Afro-Brazilian religions, and some of the leading supporters were devout 
Christians.  
For example, Reverend Lusmarina Campos Garcia, of the Lutheran Church and 
director of the Christian Church Council of Rio de Janeiro, argued that those who attack 
victims in the name of Jesus did not understand the true message of the gospels, had not 
actually studied theology, or had studied a theology based “exclusively on Western values, of 
                                                 
1 I was able to attend the public audience, but due to the challenges of understanding speakers’ Portuguese as a 
non-native speaker and a member of an audience in a large auditorium-style setting, I am also using internet 
coverage of the event and the Commission’s meeting held immediately afterwards, to support my description. 
See the following article on Marcelo Freixo’s website:  
"Comissão De Direitos Humanos Debate Intolerância Religiosa." Marcelo Freixo Deputado Estadual. 
Assembleia Legislativa Do Estado Do Rio De Janeiro, 18 Aug. 2015. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.  
2 Again, the Brazilian government associates attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions with a need for better racial 
equality measures. 
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the proprietary white man, which excluded indigenous peoples, blacks, women, and people 
of different sexual orientations.”3 In the past, Campos Garcia’s Council of Christian 
Churches of the State of Rio de Janeiro (CONIC-Rio) has made public its intention to take 
part in the rebuilding of religious temples that have suffered damage. “We need to have a 
counter testimony in response to an action as powerful as that destruction. We want to show 
that those attitudes that are presented as being Christian behavior, do not represent us,” 
declared Campos.4 The Council has become respected as an advocate for racial equality and 
religious tolerance. 
Relatedly, returning to Freixo’s public audience, Pastor Marcos Amaral of the 
Presbyterian Church argued that it was important to identify the aggressors in part to show 
society which evangelical factions were responsible for the violence. He explained that the 
majority of evangelicals did not condone the discrimination, but that the crimes are 
committed by followers of Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches; “televised groups that 
have power projects, and political and economic interests.” 5 There has been a large 
consensus that evangelicals are responsible for increasing religious and other intolerance 
across Brazil (intolerance towards homosexuals, for example, is a topic for a different 
research project), but as supported by Amaral’s statement, Brazilians often have Pentecostals 
in mind more specifically when they place blame on evangelical groups.  
                                                 
3 See f.n. 1.  
4 Geoffrey Reeson. "Thousands Call for an End to Religious Intolerance in Brazil." ALC News. Latin American 
Caribbean and Communication Agency, 02 Oct. 2014. Web. 03 Dec. 2015. 
5 Ibid.  
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A prime group that is blamed for promoting intolerance and violence is the hugely 
controversial Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which embodies Pastor Amaral’s 
description of a televised church with power projects and political and economic interests.  
1.2 The Universal Church: An Overview 
The Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, or the Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God, is a neo-Pentecostal church network that houses Brazil’s third largest Pentecostal 
congregation.6 The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (henceforth UCKG or the 
Universal Church) has about 8 million Brazilian worshippers, placing world membership 
totals above 12 million and growing. To demonstrate how saturated Brazilian cities are with 
UCKG churches, a search for churches in Rio de Janeiro alone yields 760 location results.7 
Furthermore, the UCKG is in many ways Brazil’s most vocal (and controversial) Pentecostal 
church, which is why it serves as a powerful object of study.  
Bishop Edir Macedo, the leader and founder of the UCKG, has built a media empire. 
In 1990, he purchased Rede Record, a Brazilian television network.8 The network is Brazil’s 
second-largest broadcaster, and it remains unclear how Macedo got the money to purchase it, 
but it is used as a media investment as well as a proselytizing platform. In Brazil alone, the 
UCKG owns about 23 other TV stations, 71 radio stations, and Brazil’s leading gospel record 
label.9 The Church also has a newspaper called Folha Universal with a weekly circulation of 
                                                 
6 The UCKG is third largest Pentecostal church in Brazil, after the Assemblies of God church and the Christian 
Congregation of Brazil, respectively.  
7 See the Church website’s location search feature: http://www.universal.org/locations/busca/rio-de-janeiro,-rio-
de-janeiro,-brazil/ 
 
8 "#1638, Edir Macedo and Family." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2015 
9 Rowan M Gerety. "Miracles on Demand." The Revealer. The Revealer / NYU, 22 Mar. 2013. Web. 17 Mar. 
2015;  
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about 2.5 million.10 The newspaper is free, and church volunteers pass out copies in front of 
church locations as well as on street corners, so that when I was in Rio de Janeiro for 
research, I was bombarded by church employees and offered newspaper copies countless 
times.  
In addition to this huge presence in Brazil, the Universal Church has gained 
considerable influence globally. It has a huge presence in southern Africa, namely 
Mozambique and Angola (ex-Portuguese colonies like Brazil) as well as South Africa. 
Religious sociologist and UCKG expert Paul Freston argues: 
Although other churches of Asian or Latin American origin have arrived in 
southern Africa (above all, Brazilian groups in the Lusophone countries), none 
can rival the UCKG in its numerical growth and impact on public awareness. 
Indeed, it is possible that no Christian denomination founded in the Third World 
has ever been exported so successfully and rapidly; only 27 years after its 
establishment in 1977, it has over a thousand churches in some 80 countries 
around the world, outside its native Brazil.11 
To further illustrate this geographical success, it is remarkable to note that the 
Universal Church has several media holdings in Africa. In Mozambique alone, it owns 
Record TV (also known as Miramar TV), which is Mozambique’s most popular television 
station, a newsletter with circulation rivaling the country’s leading weeklies, and a network 
of radio stations. Through all of these platforms it communicates about faith-cures for 
societal ills, including AIDS, and it advertises government-sponsored large-scale miraculous 
faith-healing gatherings.12 While this geographical spread and media presence is 
representative of many evangelical, Pentecostal, and more specifically neo-Pentecostal 
                                                 
Jeevan Vasagar. "The Exorcists." The Guardian, World. The Guardian, 14 Jan. 2001. Web. 18 Mar. 2015. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Paul Freston.  “The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Brazilian Church Finds Success in Southern 
Africa”. Journal of Religion in Africa 35.1 (2005): 34.  
12 Gerety, "Miracles on Demand." 
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churches (Pentecostals tend to be huge proselytizers and neo-Pentecostals are often 
televangelists, which is largely responsible for rapidly growing support and conversions 
around the world), Edir Macedo and his UCKG bishops have arguably gone above and 
beyond. Freston explains that the Universal Church sees itself as having a ‘universal’ 
vocation, “in the 'horizontal' sense of geographical spread as well as in the 'vertical' sense of 
the penetration of social institutions such as politics and the media.” 13  
Therefore, the actions of the Universal Church directly refute the secularization 
thesis, or at least the prong of the thesis that predicted the privatization of religion. The 
UCKG is a prime example of the way that religion is increasingly entering the realm of the 
public sphere in extreme ways with extreme success.  
1.3 Bishop Macedo Spreads Hate-Speech 
The significance of Edir Macedo’s extensive media holdings is that they have the 
potential to shape public opinion, promote political ideologies, and foster great intolerance. 
Macedo not only uses the public sphere to ask for donations, entertain loyal fans, speak the 
gospel, and televise himself speaking in tongues, but he also promotes Pentecostal morality 
to an extreme degree, demonizing groups that he sees as sinful. He has made a rather loud 
fuss about condemning Afro-Brazilian religions in televised sermons and in writing.  
Vagner Gonçalves da Silva, of the University of São Paulo, classifies neo-Pentecostal 
attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions into six categories, and the first category is “attacks made 
within the space of neo-Pentecostal church services and through their channels of divulgation 
                                                 
13 Freston, “The Universal Church…Finds Success,” 37.  
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and proselytism.”14 This behavior, which I have already begun to discuss in the introduction, 
is particularly connected to the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. Gonçalves da 
Silva explains that inside neo-Pentecostal churches, sessions are frequently held to exorcise 
demonic entities associated with Afro-Brazilian religions. The UCKG, which emphasizes 
exorcism to an uncharacteristic degree, calls these spirit extractions ‘unloading’ demonic 
entities. The exorcism process is blatantly offensive in that it takes Afro-Brazilian deities, 
sometimes specific deities held in high regard by the Afro-Brazilian religious community, 
and turns them into demons. But beneath the surface there are further and even more 
meaningful issues of disrespect. Candomblecistas and Umbandanistas view spirits as both 
possessing and being possessed by a person, being incorporated (almost literally) into that 
person. The Universal Church characterizes these entities as independently mobile spirits 
untied to any specific people, capable of targeting anyone they wish.15 From the point of 
view of Afro-Brazilian religious practitioners, the Church has stolen or appropriated their 
system, and perhaps more importantly, it has distorted their sacred beliefs.16   
From the pulpits, this intolerance and notions of exorcism are extended to the media. 
Exorcism is recorded and televised, as-is in some cases, and it is dramatized for T.V. series in 
others. Gonçalves da Silva describes such demonizing telenovelas (soap operas) and other 
                                                 
14 Vagner Gonçalves da Silva. Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on 
Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil. Mana, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 3, Selected 
Edition, 2007. Web, March 05, 2016. 
15 Patricia Birman and David Lehmann. "Religion and the Media in a Battle for Ideological Hegemony: the 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil.” (Bulletin of Latin American Research 18.2, 
1999, 145-164), 9. 
 
16 This description demonstrates some of the ways in which the Universal Church incorporates magic into its 
services. It employs some of the very elements of African-derived religions that it hates in order to express hate 
against them. Neo-Pentecostal churches have been described as embracing and reappropriating Africanness by 
numerous authors. Gonçalves da Silva discusses this in: Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions. 
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religious television programs (e.g. Fala que eu te escuto, Ponto de luz, Pare de sofrer, Show 
da fé etc.) transmitted by Edir Macedo’s Rede Record network and by other TV networks 
with time slots bought by neo-Pentecostal churches. He characterizes these programs as 
follows: 
Many of these programs show reconstructions of “real cases" or dramatizations 
in which symbols and elements from Afro-Brazilian religions are depicted as 
spiritual means for obtaining malefic results only: the death of enemies, the 
spread of disease, the separation of couples or love tangles, family 
disagreements, etc. Such programs also commonly include testimonies of 
conversion from people claiming to be past frequenters of terreiros, who are 
interviewed by the pastor and 'confess' the harm they inflicted with the help of 
Afro-Brazilian entities (referred to as encostos, 'props,' 'supports'). The most 
heavily exploited testimonies are from those claiming to be former priests of 
Afro-Brazilian religions, called ex-pais-de-encosto, 'ex-prop-fathers,' who 
explain in detail how they made despachos [ritual offerings] and the malevolent 
intentions behind them.17 
This religious use of television networks and telenovelas in particular have concerned the 
intellectual left, who have denounced telenovelas in general for their “narcotic effect on the 
political consciousness of the Brazilian masses.” 18 The portrayal of hate against African 
traditions conveyed through dramatic, extravagant soap operas has the potential to contribute 
to rising violence or at least intolerance against these groups on the ground. 
In addition to the prejudicial broadcasts on his television network, Macedo also uses 
written work to demonize Afro-Brazilian religions. He published a book called Orixás, 
Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou Demônios? whose title asks whether Afro-Brazilian deities 
(gods and goddesses and spirit guides of Afro-Brazilian religions) are actually gods or are 
demons instead. The book, which sold more than three million copies from 1997 to 2005, 
                                                 
17 Gonçalves da Silva, “Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions.”   
18 Birman and Lehmann,"Religion and the Media in a Battle,”6.  
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says that religious syncretism is “a curious and diabolical mix of African and Brazilian 
indigenous mythology, spiritism and Christianity, which created or favored the development 
of fetishistic cults like Umbanda, Quimbanda, and Candomblé.”19 In 2005, two plaintiffs 
launched a civil case against Macedo in Salvador da Bahia, calling the book “degrading, 
vituperative, prejudiced, and discriminatory” in relation to Afro-Brazilian religions.20 The 
judge, Nair Cristina de Castro, suspended sales of the book based on the notion that it was, in 
essence, hate speech. Cristina de Castro stated that the ideas put forth in the book were 
abusive to the fundamental rights of adherents to Afro-Brazilian religions but also to society 
in general who has the right to live peacefully in the face of diversity.21 Despite the initial 
ban, the book was later liberated due to freedom of speech laws. It is still sold on the 
church’s website blog, where the following sales pitch written by Macedo can be found: 
I believe it to be impossible for a practicer of Spiritism to read this book and 
continue in his practice. I believe it also to be difficult for a Christian to read this 
book and continue to profess careless and stagnant faith. All of the areas of 
demonism are exposed and discovered in this book: all of the tricks and deceit 
used by the devil and his angels to elude humanity are revealed. The reader will 
be enlightened about the origin of illness, disputes, addictions and all of the ills 
that plague society.22 
The descriptions of intolerance and hate speech above set Afro-Brazilian religious deities and 
practices up as responsible for the ills in society. Those who support Afro-Brazilian religions 
are painted as “them” in an us-versus-them and good-versus-evil scenario.  
                                                 
19 Agência Folha, comp. "Juíza Suspende Venda De Livro Do Bispo Edir Macedo." Folha Online. Folha De 
S.Paulo, 10 Nov. 2005. Web. 26 Nov. 2015 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 My own translation from Portuguese to English. Taken from: Bishop Edir Macedo. "Re: Orixás, Caboclos E 
Guias, Deuses Ou Demônios?" Web log comment. 18 May 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2015 
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Notwithstanding the colossal intolerance promoted by Macedo, he is an immensely 
popular public figure. His autobiography Nada a Perder (Nothing to Lose), which is a 
trilogy, can be found in just about any bookstore in Rio (in fact, every one of the dozen or so 
bookstores I visited in Copacabana, Botofogo, Flamengo, and downtown Rio had it on 
display in the window or near the ‘religion’ section). On the Church website it is stated that 
Macedo has sold more than 10 million books, divided into more than 30 titles.23 This 
combined with the inconceivably extensive media presence described previously 
demonstrates that Macedo’s ideas reach millions and millions worldwide, so it is rather 
frightening to ponder how many have been swayed by his condemnations of African 
traditions and Afro-Brazilian religions (and other vulnerable minorities).  
1.4 An Outsider’s Experience with the Fervent 
Even with all of my prior research on the Universal Church and my understanding of 
the blind faith that characterizes many Pentecostal congregations, attending UCKG sermons 
in person was an astonishing experience.24 The churches I visited house about three hundred 
people at a time and offer services three or four times a day, every single day (though larger 
Universal Church sites house thousands of people, and the Temple of Solomon megachurch 
headquarters in São Paulo has a seating capacity of over 10,000). True to Pentecostal 
character, especially regarding neo-Pentecostalism, UCKG services are extremely lively with 
constant music, singing, dancing, and shouting. In these relatively smaller churches that I 
                                                 
23 "Who Is Bishop Macedo." Universal. The Universal Church, n.d. Web. 26 Nov. 2015.  
 
24 The descriptions of Universal Church services that are to follow are based on my own observations during my 
five-week stay in Rio de Janeiro. My church and sermon samples are certainly limited, but my descriptions 
seem to be representative of average UCKG services as there are countless descriptions of similar services held 
by the Universal Church all around the world with the same features. See the work of Paul Freston for 
corroboration on the description of UCKG sermons.  
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visited, the pastors sing on a microphone for about two thirds of the two-hour services. They 
talk loudly over organ and CD music for the other third of the time. Adherents are 
encouraged to stand, sway, and wave their hands the entire time, and they are also 
occasionally asked to join hands with those around them. I felt completely out of place sitting 
down for more than a couple of minutes, so I took on the role of a faithful worshipper and 
stood with my hands in the air or nervously clasped in my neighbors’ throughout most of my 
visits.  
Much of the pastor’s sermon discusses bible verses touching on morality, family 
values, and faith healing. After every couple of sentences uttered by the pastor, someone 
from the audience shouts “meu deus!” meaning “my god!” (an equivalent of amen). There is 
an almost tangible element of devotion and complete submission in the air throughout the 
service, which is augmented by the low lighting, the loud volume of the microphone, the 
constant background music, and the singing and shouting. This air of devotion is particularly 
perceptible during communion, when the worshippers line up on both sides of the church to 
receive a small cup of grape juice and a wafer, and also during faith-healing rituals. There are 
two methods of faith-healing: church employees heal individual worshippers who walk in 
two single-file lines up to the stage and receive a blessing and holy oils on their foreheads, or 
the pastor mass faith-heals the entire congregation by having everyone drink from water 
bottles (that they themselves have brought from home) that he has collectively blessed, from 
the stage, all in one fell-swoop.25 As an outsider, the rituals felt shockingly economical. By 
                                                 
25 I had a moral dilemma when deciding whether to participate in faith-healing. Was I to be the only one of 
hundreds to sit out while worshippers rushed to the front of the church to receive the blessings of the pastor, or 
was I to be an imposter in line, taking part in an important ritual in which I did not believe? I decided to err on 
the side of blending in, and mimicked those around me even when it came to time to ‘be healed.’  
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the end of the service, when it is time to kneel on the ground with one’s head on her chair, 
the majority of adherents are crying and mumbling their prayers to God, often almost in a 
trance-like state. Many of the mumbles are unintelligible, although I did not personally 
witness any organized glossalia, or speaking in tongues. All the while, collection envelopes 
circulate around the room and church volunteers nudge worshippers to donate. The pastor 
ends the service with several minutes’ shouting about a need for the congregation to donate 
as much as they can. As a visitor uninterested in donating, the most discomfort I experienced 
was at the end of each service when I tried to avoid the collection envelopes and the 
volunteers’ stares.26  
One of the many important observations to take away from this depiction above is the 
adoration the worshippers hold for their pastor. As someone unfamiliar with such religiosity, 
the unfettered devotion of the congregation was a bit disconcerting to me.27 Somewhat to my 
surprise, I did not hear any condemnations of different faiths when I attended Universal 
Church services. However, during every single service I attended (hearing four different 
pastors’ sermons on a couple different occasions each), I observed a powerful rhetoric 
discussing a sort of cosmic war. The words ‘guerra,’ ‘batalha,’ and ‘luta’ (meaning war, 
battle, and fight respectively) were uttered countless times, always in the context that 
Pentecostal worshippers need to fight outside forces (those opposed to Pentecostalism, and 
                                                 
26 The UCKG is more effective than most churches in collecting tithes. In addition to the aggressive sales 
pitches from the pulpit that I witnessed, it also tries to commit members to regular weekly donation amounts or 
salary percentage commitments. For more on these tactics and their effectiveness, see: 
Birman and Lehmann, "Religion and the Media in a Battle.”  
27 It is also crucial to recognize that the Universal Church, like countless other Pentecostal churches and 
churches of different denominations and religions, has done immeasurable good for countless communities. For 
example, the Church has raised food and money for the poor on a large scale and set up numerous rehabilitation 
centers for drug addicts in Brazil where there is little to no public funding in this sector. It is not my intent to 
ignore such positive behaviors, but for the sake of staying on topic, I will mostly concern myself with behaviors 
relevant to the research questions outlined in the introduction.  
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evil in general).28 One pastor warned that the devil was going to visit each of the worshippers 
in the body of someone trying to question their faith, and it was the worshippers’ duty to 
remain faithful. On a couple of occasions, adherents were likened to soldados, or soldiers, 
fighting for the greater good in the face of evil. This rhetoric received several cries of support 
from the audience, and most of the descriptions were extremely vague, so that the audience 
was not explicitly told who the enemy was or what actions were justified in fighting against 
it. Universal Church followers are being taught by the leaders they adore to engage in 
ambiguous wars with unspecified enemies. 
To describe this language, I borrow the term ‘cosmic war’ from Professor Mark 
Juergensmeyer of University of California, Santa Barbara. Juergensmeyer writes in numerous 
works and lectures regularly about the great battle between good and evil, right and wrong, 
and religion and irreligion that is going on in the minds of the world’s most fervent 
worshippers. He explains that the authority of religion gives worshippers the “moral standing 
to employ violence,” making religious terrorism (and for my purposes violence more 
generally) difficult to combat because “its enemies have become satanized: one cannot 
negotiate with them or easily compromise.”29 
I am not the first to recognize a rhetoric about war used by Pentecostals or 
specifically the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, as ideas about cosmic wars or holy 
wars can be found in a variety of official church publications from numerous Pentecostal 
groups. For example, in his preface to Edir Macedo’s Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou 
                                                 
 
29 Mark Juergensmeyer. “Terror in the Name of God,” in Thinking Globally: A Global Studies Reader (Univ of 
California Press, 2013), 298.  
As the research of Professor Juergensmeyer shows, this rhetoric can be found in many other religions outside of 
Pentecostalism, including other sects of Christianity, messianic Judaisim, and extremist Islam to name a few. 
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Demônios? Pastor J Cabral writes, “Pastor Macedo has embarked on a true holy war against 
all of the work of the devil.”30 Using this rhetoric allows the protagonist to use a God-given 
moral authority to position his opposition as the enemy in a kill-or-be-killed scenario.  In the 
case of the sermons I attended, the enemy was anyone challenging the true faith. In Pastor 
Cabral’s description in the preface to Macedo’s inflammatory book, the enemy, or the work 
of the devil, is synonymous with African spirits and traditions. It is not a leap, then, to fear 
that congregation members are interpreting their enemies to be Afro-Brazilian religious 
followers.  
1.5 The UCKG Builds an Army for God 
In support of the rhetoric of 
the cosmic war, the UCKG has 
recently formed a group for faithful 
young men called the Gladiadores do 
Altar, or Gladiators of the Altar. The 
Church reportedly formed the group 
with the declared intention of 
attracting new pastors, but a video 
clip of the Gladiators that has been 
circulating through Brazilian news 
channels and internet sites has 
                                                 
30 Quoted from Júlio César Tavares Dias. "Religiões Afro-brasileiras No Discurso Da Igreja Universal Do 
Reino De Deus: A Reinvenção Do Demônio."Unicap. (Universidade Católica De Pernambuco, 2012), 68. Web. 
1 Dec. 2015.  
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caused many to question the real motivations behind its formation.31 In the clip, hundreds of 
young men with buzz-cuts and matching 
uniforms march and chant in unison and shout 
that they are “ready for battle.”32 Some 
scholars see this as a marketing campaign to 
attract young boys from the periphery into the 
Church, but adherents to Afro-Brazilian faiths 
are worried enough that they actually sent 
representatives to the Federal Public Ministry 
on March 23, 2015 to demand an investigation into possible cases of religious intolerance.33 
Like me, they have noticed that the UCKG condemns Afro-Brazilian religions and that it 
promotes a language of war, and some are starting to worry that “if the language is of war, 
then their practice might be as well.” 34 Figure 3 is an image of protest that has been 
circulating around Instagram. On the right side of the picture is a Gladiador do Altar (with 
the Universal Church symbol on his shirt), and he is stabbing the female Candomblecista on 
the left. The woman is dressed in typical Candomblé attire and appears to be Afro-Brazilian. 
As we see all of these behaviors of the Church start to unfold, it becomes rather clear 
that the combination of Macedo’s hate speech, his wide and well-receiving audience, the 
                                                 
31 A quick youtube search of ‘gladiadores do altar’ provides a couple dozen results linking to the video of the 
boys marching. For a Brazilian journalist’s description of the event, see:  
Deutche Welle. ""Exército" Da Universal Preocupa Religiões Afro-brasileiras.” (The article title translates out 
to “Universal Church’s “army” worries Afro-Brazilian religions.”) 
 
32 The picture of the Gladiadores do Altar on the right was posted on Instagram by Jean Wyllys, a progressive 
politician from the PSOL party. 
 
33 Deutche Welle. ""Exército" Da Universal Preocupa Religiões Afro-brasileiras.” 
34 Ibid.  
Figure 3 
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Church’s rhetoric on war, and the encouragement of young devotees to form a militarized 
group that is “ready for battle,” has the potential to incite intolerance and violence. The 
UCKG is not entirely or even largely representative of all Pentecostals of course,35 but it is 
representative of the most fervent and extremist kinds of Pentecostals, which are the ones I 
am concerned with in this project. With the behaviors discussed above progressing alongside 
an increase in physical attacks on Candomblecistas and Umbandanistas, it is unsurprising 
that the historically-marginalized Afro-Brazilian religious community feels persecuted and 
fearful of the future. This fear has caused many members of the Afro-Brazilian religious 
community to speak out against evangelicals, Pentecostals, and specifically the Universal 
Church using images like the one above but also making statements in the media and in 
courts. 
1.6 Intolerance Must Be Tolerated  
The UCKG’s official position is that the Church itself is the true target of religious 
intolerance, which has been declared in a handful of publications. In an opinion column in 
the Brazilian newspaper, Folha de S. Paulo, public relations manager and Bishop in the 
Universal Church Carlos Oliveira argued that the UCKG experiences prejudice from 
outsiders as a result of demonizing propaganda spread on the internet. He writes, “The 
absence of a frank and clear discussion pushes the Universal Church, the evangelical 
denominations, and other minority religions to a circus armed by opportunists that sow 
prejudice and ignorance against us.”36 In Oliveira’s eyes, non-Pentecostals are threatened by 
                                                 
35 And in fact on my visits to very small, local congregations of independent churches in Rio I witnessed much 
less discussion of holy war, for example.  
36 Leiliane Lopes. "A Igreja Universal é Vítima De Preconceito, Escreve Bispo." Gospel Prime RSS. Gospel 
Prime, 27 May 2013. Web. 02 Dec. 2015. 
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the Church because of its rapid expansion and success, putting the Church at the forefront as 
a victim of intolerance. He does not mention the Universal Church’s position on Afro-
Brazilian religions or directly refute common accusations made against the Church. I have 
seen a couple of articles printed in the Folha Universal collaborating this sentiment – the 
UCKG is promoting a narrative that places itself as the victim, where accusing them of 
intolerance and hate speech is in itself intolerant.  
To be fair, there are websites and Facebook pages dedicated to exposing the Church’s 
every misstep and calling for its dissolution, and cartoons like the one above depicting the 
Gladiador as a murderer are prejudicial. It is also logical that indeed there are many who are 
threatened by the Church’s rapid expansion, particularly where its media empire, political 
influence, and physical construction of church sites are concerned. Other religions and even 
other Christian denominations are losing members through conversion to the UCKG.  
The rest of the narrative placing the Church as the victim, however, holds little 
weight. Contrary to what it would have the world believe, the Universal Church is not 
exorcising spirits and condemning African traditions (and homosexual and other groups) 
defensively. It uses the public sphere to shape public opinion. It is on the offensive in a 
campaign to spread hate. 
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Chapter 2 
Motivations for the Intolerance 
 As demonstrated in previous chapters, intolerance, hate, and violence are on the rise 
against Afro-Brazilian religions this is correlated to the rise of Pentecostalism. I have 
established that a Pentecostal rhetoric of war supports or even promotes this hate. A common 
justification for intolerant behaviors is that it is the religious freedom of Pentecostals to 
promote intolerance, and that their intolerance must be tolerated. What remains less clear, 
however, are the motivations behind the spread of hate and violence. Why are leaders of 
Pentecostal churches (for example, the UCKG’s Edir Macedo) spreading hate speech? Why 
are congregations heavily persuaded by this? What makes Afro-Brazilian religions in 
particular one of the biggest victims? What role, if any, does race play?    
 In this chapter, I will examine some of the motivations behind Pentecostals’ targeting 
of Candomblé and Umbanda. Supporting common perceptions of the Brazilian media, I first 
assert that issues of competition and moral disagreement are at play in these conflicts. 
Second, I will look at the role of race. While Brazilian race and skin color as well as racial 
demographics within these religious groups are enormously complex, the use of Candomblé 
as a symbol of black identity in Brazil necessarily links the religion to blackness. Thus, I 
argue that attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions cannot be separated out from attacks on Afro-
Brazilians. Whether it is a conscious motivator or not, race is one factor in the victimization 
of Candomblé and Umbanda. Examining instances where Pentecostals in Africa have spread 
hate against African traditions and ultimately been accused of racism can begin to illuminate 
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this question. I will describe how the ethnocentrism of the Universal Church in particular, in 
Africa, links attacks on African religious and other traditions to racial prejudice.  
Defining motivations is especially difficult because of a doubt as to whether the 
groups in question are communicating honestly about their motives and intentions, or 
whether there are hidden motives. Motives are often expressed in disguised form. It is also 
difficult to know whether there are motivations the groups themselves are not even conscious 
of. This is not to mention that the labels of evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, and neo-
Pentecostalism are umbrella labels encompassing diverse groups with diverse attitudes 
towards African traditions and diverse motivations behind their actions. Tracing lines of 
causation in such matters is notoriously challenging, and I do not claim to do this fully. 
2.1 Competition and Moral Condemnation 
A general consensus in politics and the media is that a “low-intensity war” is being 
fought for Brazilian souls.1 Thus, the interpretation is that the conflicts between Afro-
Brazilian religions and evangelicals in general are simply conflicts of competition. Paul 
Freston, an academic expert on the UCKG, explains that numerical success is highly valued 
in Brazilian evangelical churches, which is “a plausible motivation for a church that enjoys 
organizing huge events and whose newspapers are full of photographs showing packed 
auditoria.”2 Regarding the UCKG’s expansion around the globe and especially in Africa, 
Freston argues that “in the case of a highly proselytistic church, [UCKG] global expansion 
must have some connection with the romance of fulfilling the classic Christian missionary 
                                                 
1 Dom Phillips. "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle against Evangelical Hostility." Washington Post. The 
Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2015. Web. 02 Dec. 2015. 
2 Paul Freston. “The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Brazilian Church Finds Success in Southern 
Africa.” Journal of Religion in Africa 35.1 (BRILL, 2005), 33–65. 
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mandate.” 3 Evangelical and specifically Pentecostal churches are actively expanding and 
recruiting throughout Brazil and globally, and this necessarily means encroaching on territory 
held by other religions. 
Returning to the local level, Pentecostalism advertises to demographics that are 
traditionally linked to Afro-Brazilian religions. Both groups appeal to uneducated urban and 
rural poor populations, and this is true for the Universal Church above and beyond other 
Pentecostal churches. It is reasonable to assert that the religious groups in question see each 
other as threatening because of their attempts to maintain strong support bases in overlapping 
demographic groups. Furthermore, Pentecostal groups are invading Afro-Brazilian religions’ 
territories, as demonstrated in the introduction in the discussion on the evangelical presence 
in favelas. Rio’s Committee to Combat Religious Intolerance argues that Pentecostal groups 
demonize Candomblé and Umbanda in order to bolster their own numbers. This all relates 
back to the value of numerical success, which is also undoubtedly connected to power and 
money. In addition to providing boasting rights, larger Pentecostal congregations donate 
larger amounts of Brazilian reais through tithing and other means. In the case of the 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, this means more support for national and global 
media empires.  
There is also an issue of moral disagreement. Author Jeffrey Haynes describes 
Candomblé as a religion of the body, undertaken with trance, music, and dance, 
differentiating it from Pentecostalism:4 “Candomblé is a festive religion, where notions 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
 
4 Note, though, that Haynes does not address the fact that Pentecostalism is also undertaken through trance, 
music, and dance, in different ways. Embracing bodily elements, like dance (and especially exorcism) is most 
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central to Western theology – including, sin, guilt, and expiation – play little or no role.”5 
Relatedly, many Pentecostals see Afro-Brazilian religions as immoral and link them with 
homosexuality and overindulgence, depicting these behaviors as satanic. It is reasonable to 
assert that Pentecostalism probably does not denounce homosexuality for reasons of 
competition, but instead because it considers homosexuality a sin, and it is possible that a 
similar thing can be said about Afro-Brazilian traditions more generally.  
Another example of an ‘immoral’ practice in the eyes of Pentecostals is the common 
Candomblé practice of animal sacrifice. Some Candomblecistas still kill chickens by 
chopping their heads off, after which they offer the blood and guts to the orixás and eat the 
rest of the meat. While this kind of butchery (sacrificial or not) is a standard practice in many 
non-Western places throughout the world, it has received much criticism and its legality has 
been questioned in Brazil (and other places such as the U.S.), especially by Pentecostals. 
Perhaps part of competing with Afro-Brazilian groups is to genuinely save as many souls as 
possible and denounce as much ‘evil’ and immorality as possible. So, it may be the case that 
Afro-Brazilians get condemned for exactly the reasons that Pentecostals give – many 
Pentecostals may genuinely see them as demonic and sinful, and they are attempting to save 
people from these influences.   
Both hypotheses above are easily supported. Afro-Brazilian religions’ lack of ascetic 
conduct and their controversial practices are likely enough to provoke denunciation from 
Pentecostals. It is also important to recognize that most Pentecostal churches accept anyone 
                                                 
characteristic of the UCKG out of any Brazilian Pentecostal church. However, the UCKG characterizes its use 
of the body as good and Afro-Brazilian religions’ use of the body as evil in a dualistic system.  
5 Jeffrey Haynes. “African Diaspora Religions.” In Juergensmeyer, Mark, ed. Thinking Globally: A Global 
Studies Reader, 63-68 (Univ of California Press, 2014), 65. 
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who wishes to join, in a sort of condemn-the-sin-not-the-sinner mindset, helping to support a 
notion of competition through growing congregations. As evangelicals, Pentecostals take up 
a responsibility to preach the word of God to the unconverted, whoever the unconverted may 
be. The following excerpt from Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou Demônios? written by 
Edir Macedo supports both the competition and morality arguments from above: 
In our church, we have hundreds of ex-pais-de-santo and ex-mães-de-santo 
[priests and priestesses respectively], who were deceived by malignant spirits 
for years. After attending one of our meetings motivated by radio or television 
programs, or brought by another person that already frequented our services, 
they were transformed into new creatures.6 
Macedo encourages conversion (which bolsters numbers and happens to increase revenues 
for the Church, helping to maintain Macedo’s position on Forbes’ list of billionaires) and 
also promotes the saving of persons who have been deceived by demons, elevating 
Pentecostalism to a morally superior status.  
It is undoubtedly the case that competition and morality are both at play in 
Pentecostal denunciation of minority religions, most likely in different ratios for different 
persons. Macedo is more likely to be motivated by competition and money than the average 
worshipper or the anonymous Brazilian who physically attacks someone like Kailane 
Campos. So, competition is probably more likely to be a factor in the behavior of religious 
leadership than in the congregation. On the other hand, worshippers at lower levels may more 
often feel that they are “saving souls” and weeding out sin.  
                                                 
6 My translation of an excerpt cited in: Tavares Dias, Júlio César. "Religiões Afro-brasileiras No Discurso Da 
Igreja Universal Do Reino De Deus: A Reinvenção Do Demônio."Unicap. (Universidade Católica De 
Pernambuco, 2012), 68. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. Excerpt taken from Macedo’s Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou 
Demônios, p 17.  
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2.2 The Race Factor 
However, there is the other common interpretation that intolerance against Afro-
Brazilian religious groups is motivated by racism as much or more than competition or moral 
prejudice. The question of race cannot be overlooked, especially if many from the Afro-
Brazilian religious community hold the perception that they are victims of a legacy of 
historical racism that continues today. Furthermore, as Pentecostal numbers grow rapidly 
(specifically through neo-Pentecostal global networks), it is crucial to investigate whether 
there is something about the religious sect itself that fosters racial disharmony.  
It is quite difficult, though, to pinpoint the role of race and racism in the violence 
committed by Pentecostals against Afro-Brazilian religions in part because, unlike in past 
centuries, the attackers do not expound racial motivations. Furthermore, the histories, 
demographic traits, and the relationship between race and religious identity for the groups 
involved are enormously complex. The situation is, quite literally, not black and white.  
Religio-Racial Demographics 
Based on the 2010 Brazilian census, I constructed a table to demonstrate racial 
demographics within religious categories, which can be found in Appendix B. My findings 
were that out of over 25 million Brazilians listed under “Evangelicals of Pentecostal Origin,” 
about 41% of them consider themselves “white,” 49% are “brown,” and less than 9% are 
“black.” Out of over 407k Umbandanistas in the census, about 54% are white, 27% are 
brown, and 17% are black, and out of over 167k Candomblecistas, about 30% are white, 
nearly 40% are brown, and nearly 30% are black. While Pentecostalism has a much larger 
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proportion of whites than Candomblé and also holds the smallest proportion of blacks, the 
numbers demonstrate that none of these groups is racially uniform.  
To further complicate the picture, it is important to note that these racial 
categorizations are self-reported – the Brazilian census office asks people “What is your race 
or color?” and offers respondents a choice between branco (white), pardo (brown), preto 
(black), amarelo (yellow), and indigena (indigenous).7 Respondents subjectively label 
themselves, and the labels offered are a bit of an oversimplification when compared to the 
way that Brazilians usually conceptualize race or color. When the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) took a similar national census in 1976, the question asking 
Brazilians to describe their own skin color was open-ended, and it famously yielded 136 
results.8 The results included colors like alvinha (snowy white), azul (blue), acastanhada 
(somewhat chestnut-colored) café com leite (café au lait, or coffee with milk), pouco-clara 
(not very light), pretinha (black, with a dimunitive meaning young or small), etc.9 None of 
the respondents listed preto (without the diminutive) as their skin color, although one of the 
categories was negra (also meaning black). The government most likely continued offering 
the five color options in their later surveys as a response to this multifarious mess of results, 
but their five options are not quite in line with popular discourse.  
Admittedly, Edward Telles explains that roughly 95% of the respondents in the 1976 
survey stuck to 6 relatively basic colors generally overlapping with the ones given in today’s 
                                                 
7 Luisa Farah Schwartzman. “Does Money Whiten? Intergenerational Changes in Racial Classification in 
Brazil”. American Sociological Review 72.6 (2007): 941. Web.  
8 Associated Press. "136 Variations of Brazilian Skin Colors." USA Today. Gannett, 08 July 2014. Web. 01 Feb. 
2016.  
9 Ibid. Translations of the skin colors originally published on the website “Africa is a Country” by Lilia Moritz 
Schwarcz of the University of Sao Paulo. 
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census, along with moreno, which I will return to below.10 Despite this clustering around 6 
terms for the official survey, though, few scholars would describe the list of color labels in 
the Brazilian imaginary as numerically limited. Race in popular Brazilian discourse, at the 
grass-roots level, is indeed conceptualized using dozens of personalized skin color labels, 
most often referring to some shade of brown or another. Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr., of 
PBS, argues that “racial categories are on steroids” and explains that “color [in Brazil] is in 
the eye of the beholder.”11  When Gates, who is an African-American, asks four Brazilians 
off the street to describe his skin color, they each give a different label for the same color: 
moreno (brown), caboclo (indigenous), mulatto (mixed), cafuzo (a mixture of African and 
Amerindian ancestry), and negro.12 He also asks a group of men with varying dark skin color 
shades how they identify themselves, and they all initially self-identify as negro. But when 
Gates points out that their tones differ quite a bit, they each list unique secondary labels 
distinguishing themselves from each other (e.g. moreno-oscuro or dark brown, versus 
moreno-claro, or light brown).13 Sometimes Brazilians may stick to general categories, 
similar to the ones used on the census, and other times they may branch off into specific 
color labels. This use of diverse labels (Gates insists that there are over 100 of them, and that 
they are indeed used in everyday exchanges) has become known as Brazil’s color continuum. 
This continuum allows Brazilians to measure themselves as lighter or darker relative to each 
other.  
                                                 
10 Edward E Telles.  Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton University 
Press, 2014), 95. 
11 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. “Black in Latin America E02, Brazil: A Racial Paradise,” YouTube video, 3:43, from 
a PBS series called Black in Latin America, 2011, posted by Bladeboy05, April 15th, 2016.  
12 Ibid, 3:49 : 4:13. 
13 Ibid, 4:15 : 4:45. 
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As introduced above, in the open-ended 1976 census and other national surveys, 
moreno has consistently held as one of the most popular labels, even in popular discourse. 
Moreno has never been offered as an option on the census despite being much more popular 
than its census counterpart, pardo. It generally means brown, but ethnographers have found it 
ambiguous enough to substitute for almost any other color category. It is seen as tied to the 
racial-democracy ideology by emphasizing a common Brazilianness. Some ethnographers 
have found that if the census used moreno instead of pardo, the results would show a smaller 
white population and a larger non-white population.14 So, the term for brown offered on the 
Brazilian census has important implications for the white to non-white ratio in the racial 
demographic landscape. 
But while moreno appeals to a universal Brazilian identity, it is criticized for ignoring 
or diminishing blackness by many black activists. Activists reject moreno and seek to 
diminish ambiguity and destigmatize blackness by embracing the term negro. Negro was 
once considered highly offensive and has never been offered as an option by the Brazilian 
census (despite being listed by respondents on the open-ended survey), but black activists 
have turned it into a political category asserting ethnic pride.15 The woman that describes 
Professor Gates as negro proudly declares “I am not a racist” after labeling him.16 The 
exchange connotes an element of black solidarity, and it also suggests that perhaps it is 
acceptable for her to use a term that was tied to racism in the past was specifically because 
she is not racist. In offering the more politically correct term preto and not offering negro, the 
                                                 
14 Telles, Race in Another America, 95.  
15 Ibid.  
16 See f.n. 12.  
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Brazilian census overlooks or ignores an option that is important to a segment of the black 
community.  
In addition to oversimplifying the ways in which Brazilians conceptualize color, the 
census also points to the ways in which Brazilians tend to conflate racial origins with color 
appearance. Even the census survey question “What is your race or color?” poses race and 
color as one-in-the-same. Unlike in the United States, race in Brazil refers much more to skin 
color or physical appearance than to ancestry.17 So observable color functions in Brazil 
similar to the way that racial heritage functions in the United States. Telles notes one 
exception to this: even more than preferring the term negro, some black movement leaders 
prefer “afrodescendente [(African-descendent)] because it clearly identifies the descendants 
of enslaved Africans, which is critical in the reparations (for slavery) movement.” 18 In this 
unique case there is an emphasis on racial heritage over color. However, this is ignored by 
most of Brazilian society and by censuses and other surveys, which use colors as racial 
categories. 
With color classification as basically synonymous with racial classification comes a 
subjective tendency to “whiten.” In the United States, a person with any African ancestry is 
legally defined as black, but Brazil has no such laws. Brazilians tend to be inclined to label 
themselves and others as something other than black, regardless of ancestry. The 136 colors 
listed on the 1976 survey that now make up the color continuum are seen as whitening tools 
– they are ways to avoid racial classification as black. Telles explains how a large number of 
Brazilians who label themselves as white have African ancestors, along with countless 
                                                 
17 Telles, Race in Another America, 1. 
18 Telles, Race in Another America, 23. 
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members of the brown and mestiço (mixed-race) populations.19 This conflation of race with 
color along with the subjective self-reporting of respondents produces biologically inaccurate 
but sociologically important demographic data favoring whiteness. 
In relation to whitening, survey-based research has demonstrated instances of color 
reclassification. Sociologists have found that “black” or “mulatto” Brazilian families become 
“whiter” as they move socially upward.20 Researcher Louisa Farah Schwartzman finds that 
“more-educated nonwhite parents are more likely to marry whites and less likely to marry 
nonwhites, and more-educated interracial couples label their children white more often than 
do less-educated interracial couples.” 21  
If socioeconomic status and education levels affect the self-identification and 
reporting of race, then it is certainly possible that religion does this as well. This begs the 
question, are Candomblecistas, Umbandanistas, and evangelicals or Pentecostals more likely 
to identify as one color than another?  When a religious person fills out survey questions on 
race, is there a correlation between his or her religion and the racial color category (s)he 
selects apart from observable skin color? I wonder if practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions 
with dark skin are more likely to identify as preto or negro than Brazilians with comparable 
skin tones but with negative views of Afro-Brazilian religions? I would not be surprised if 
the black population of Pentecostals (9%, according the survey) were hugely 
underrepresented, more so than the Afro-Brazilian religions. This needs further research. 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  
20 Schwartzman, “Does Money Whiten?” 941. 
21Ibid. 
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Religio-Racial Identity Constructions & Black Activism 
Despite the colossal complexity of the sociology behind the racial demographic 
reporting in Brazil, it is reasonable to describe each of the religious groups in question as 
racially diverse and encompassing of members from all colors along the continuum. 
Furthermore, switching the angle to look at how race (or rather color) categories are divided 
up into religious groups, most Afro-Brazilians are actually Christian (the Afro-Brazilian 
religions, again, are significant but small minorities). In his article, “What is the Color of the 
Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil,” John Burdick describes how a 
series of surveys taken in the late 1990s demonstrated that “Brazilians who identify 
themselves at the dark end of the color continuum are converting to Pentecostal churches 
over historical Protestant churches at a rate of about three to one.”22 So, Pentecostalism has 
become the most popular Christian sect for black Brazilians. This reinforces the idea that 
Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian religions appeal to and compete for adherents from 
overlapping demographics. If Pentecostalism recruits and accepts black Brazilians so 
zealously, and Brazilians with African heritage support Pentecostal organizations and leaders 
that provoke violence against Afro-Brazilian religions, racism becomes much too easy to 
dismiss.  
This holds especially true when I recount my experience with the Universal Church 
of the Kingdom of God. The Universal Church has been accused more than any other of 
intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions, and yet the pews at the sermons that I attended 
were filled with people that fall all along the color continuum (based on my own observation, 
                                                 
22 John Burdick. “What Is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil”. Latin 
American Research Review 34.2 (1999). Latin American Studies Association: 109–31. 
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and again, I wonder how they might label their own skin colors). In fact, in Copacabana in 
particular, there were very few observably “white” or European-looking followers in the 
pews – most everyone appeared, at least to my unskilled eye, to have African or other non-
white ancestry. The Universal Church has been described by researchers as housing larger 
percentages of Brazilians with dark skin tones than other Pentecostal churches. Why would 
blacks support a church that attacks African traditions if not because they genuinely believe 
the traditions are sinful, regardless and not because of racial identity connections? It seems 
counter-intuitive to assert that racism is supported by black Pentecostals. 
Nonetheless, the surface picture that racism is not involved is much too simplistic. 
The complex racial demographics of the religious groups in question do not rule out racism, 
as black racism against other blacks is not unheard of. We know that Afro-Brazilian religions 
remain strongly associated with blackness and African identity to this day (hence the label as 
Afro-Brazilian). Despite racial mixing within the religious categories, blacks are more likely 
than whites and browns to practice Afro-Brazilian religions. Using a table built on census 
data, from a 1995 publication authored by Reginaldo Prandi, of the University of São Paulo, 
Telles describes the following trends: 
Nationally, white and brown participation in umbanda and candomblé is 
similar. The primary cleavage is between blacks and non-blacks. Blacks are 
twice as likely as non-blacks to participate in umbanda and three to four times 
as likely to participate in candomblé… Brown and white participation rates are 
also similar across metropolitan areas except in Rio de Janeiro and Porto 
Alegre, where browns are intermediate to whites and blacks and where 
participation by all groups is greatest.23  
                                                 
23 Telles, Race in Another America, 115. 
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From another table constructed from survey data from the State of Rio de Janeiro, in 
2000, Telles discovers that self-identified blacks are significantly more likely than browns 
and whites to view Afro-Brazilian religious traditions (specifically holding a belief in orixás 
and wearing white clothes on Friday) as well as other cultural forms associated with 
blackness, such as capoeira and samba music, as important in their lives.24 It is unfortunate 
that all of these respondents were not only asked about viewing Afro-Brazilian traditions as 
important, but also about associating these traditions with any range of negative descriptors.  
These findings help us to understand the use of Afro-Brazilian religious symbols in 
black rights activism throughout Brazil. Stephen Selka expounds that in their struggle for 
racial equality, “Black activists emphasize the semiotic link between Afro-Brazilian religion 
and black identity in their mobilization efforts, and the symbolic connection between 
Candomblé and blackness is strong enough that many equate acts of intolerance against 
Candomblé with racism.”25 This association between blackness and African religious 
traditions is widely advertised – it can be assumed that Pentecostals and other evangelicals 
are aware of it, and that they are aware of the correlation between attacks on these traditions 
and perceptions of racism. 
Conversely, an antagonism and few lines of communication exist between the black 
movement and the Pentecostal movement. The lack of a Pentecostal presence in black rights 
activism suggests that blackness is not a salient part of Pentecostal group identity. This seems 
unusual if we consider that most Pentecostals have some African ancestry (remember that 
                                                 
24 Ibid, 117. 
25 Stephen L. Selka. “Ethnoreligious Identity Politics in Bahia, Brazil.” Latin American Perspectives 32 (1). 
Sage Publications, Inc. (2005): 75.  
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only 41% of evangelicals of Pentecostal origin described themselves as white in the Brazilian 
census, and this is likely an exaggeration regarding biological ancestry if we consider 
sociological tendencies to whiten). 
John Burdick discusses the antagonism between the black consciousness movement 
and Pentecostalism, but he sees this antagonism as largely arising out of black activists’ 
rejection of Pentecostalism.26 He cites four sources for this rejection. First, he says, black 
activists reject Christianity because of its historical ties to slavery. Next, Protestantism in 
general is regarded by many in the black movement as the religion of ethnic assimilation – 
conversion is seen as adopting a host of white cultural traits. They criticize black conversion 
to Protestantism as a process of whitening and self-rejection. Third, Protestantism focuses on 
the individual and under-emphasizes group identity. It also values universalism, leaving little 
room for the growth of ethnic identity. Finally, as I have described, black movement activists 
interpret Pentecostal attacks on religions of African origin as attacks on black ethnic 
identity.27  Burdick’s findings were that black movement activists view black converts to 
Protestantism and particularly Pentecostalism as forgetting or dismissing their ethnic identity.  
As Burdick seems to admit, these perceptions are generally based on observable 
characteristics of Protestant Christianity and Pentecostalism specifically. While each church 
has its own characteristic and should be evaluated accordingly, these perceptions are 
generally legitimate. Pentecostalism preaches the salvation of the individual soul with little 
emphasis on group characteristics apart from religion. The group identity is that of the 
universal brotherhood that worships Christ, leaving little room for race or ethnicity-based 
                                                 
26 John Burdick, “What is the Color of the Holy Spirit?” 
27 Ibid, 110.  
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identity. It is in this way that black activists argue that Pentecostalism erodes black identity. 
For black activism to assert equality and recognition of black rights and dignity, it is 
necessary to recognize blackness and racial difference. It is necessary to minimally take pride 
in skin color and encouraged to additionally take pride in ethnic heritage. This heritage 
includes black roots like African religious traditions, even if or perhaps especially because 
they have slowly been eroded as dominant practices of black populations. These are things 
that the universal brotherhood of Christs’ followers tend to minimize. Acknowledging ethnic 
difference in diverse religious populations can be seen as counter-productive to promoting 
universal camaraderie. And promoting racial pride has the potential to take away from 
individual relationships to the church and to God.  
To be thorough, there are of course evangelical and even Pentecostal churches, 
leaders, or members that do promote positive salient racial identity. There is even an 
increasing Christian black rights movement in Brazil. John Burdick challenges the notion of 
an incompatibility between evangelical Christianity and black rights activism by describing a 
series of Protestant groups that emerged out of the 1990s dedicated to fighting racism and 
expressing a black identity.28 Most of the groups described are small and non-Pentecostal 
(e.g. Lutherans – typically not thought of as evangelical – and Baptists and Methodists – 
often described as evangelical). Members of a couple of major Pentecostal organizations 
have been active in the black rights arena, namely coming from the Assembly of God church 
and the Foursquare Church. But both of these are more closely associated with traditional 
Pentecostalism than neo-Pentecostalism. While both categories have had problems with 
                                                 
28 John Burdick. "Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing in Brazil?." Journal of Latin American 
Studies 37, no. 02 (2005), 311-332. 
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intolerance against Afro-Brazilian traditions, neo-Pentecostalism is much more correlated 
with intolerance specifically targeted at Candomblé and Umbanda. To my knowledge, the 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, an emblematic neo-Pentecostal church, has not 
been active in black rights activism. It has reportedly printed articles in its newspaper 
condemning racism, but these articles often go hand-in-hand with ethnocentric language, 
which I will discuss later.  
Burdick argues for a few conditions that have allowed the black evangelical 
movement to grow. First, the emergence of new political opportunities created by the state, 
which has increasingly supported racial equality measures, including affirmative action. 
Burdick explains that evangelical Christianity teaches followers to adhere to secular authority 
and operate within the law and suggests that a lack of state support explains a lack of 
evangelical support for racial equality in the past. But now that the state expresses anti-racist 
sentiments, evangelicals can as well.29 Second, according to Burdick, the appearance of new 
technological and social resources, including the conversion of black activists to evangelical 
churches, has fostered a push for racial equality, because those activists are then able to 
spread their ideas to the congregations.30 Third, the introduction into the repertoire of 
evangelical activists of interpretive frames that have been enormously resonant for 
evangelical audiences, such as texts pointing to the presence of blacks in the bible.31 Finally, 
a shift in the 1990s of the class structure of Afro-Brazilians which produced upwardly mobile 
black evangelical activists.32   
                                                 
29 Burdick, “Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing?” 319. 
30 Ibid, 322.  
31 Ibid, 325.  
32 Ibid, 329. 
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While most of this is descriptive and seems reasonable, I take issue with the first 
point. It is crucial to note that the Brazilian state also generally promotes religious tolerance 
and freedom, as described in the introduction, and that many groups of evangelicals fail to 
adhere to that element of secular authority. As I explained in the introduction, Brazil’s Racial 
Equality Act protects free expression of the “religious cults” of African origin, making 
oppression of Afro-Brazilian religious practices a violation of anti-racism law. Note that 
accounting for these religions under racial equality law does not necessarily deem the 
motivations for the attacks as racist, but it does suggest that in the eyes of the government, 
the recipients of the attacks are experiencing some sort of racism or racial prejudice, and that 
the outcome of the attacks is racial disharmony. The extremist kinds of evangelicals that I am 
discussing throughout this project illegally attack Afro-Brazilian religions and therefore 
violate racial equality measures under the law. They also undermine secularity in general 
with their various presences in the public sphere. It is thus slightly too simplistic to 
generalize evangelicalism as supporting secular authority and operating within the law. 33   
To return to Burdick’s argument, he asserts that the failure of the black movement to 
connect with Protestant Christianity has stemmed from black activists’ insistence on the 
centrality of non-Christian religion to black identity. He sees the small but significant and 
growing black evangelical movement as having the potential to “[break] this bottleneck, by 
                                                 
33 Which is not to say that it always undermines secular authority or operates outside of the law, either, of 
course. It is feasible that many or most evangelicals/Pentecostals are law-abiding citizens, and that some of 
them have mobilized in black activism because the state now supports it. But the claim that evangelical 
Christianity in general specifically teaches followers to operate within the law and uphold secular authority, 
suggesting that evangelical Christians held back from black activism in the past because it was not supported by 
the state, overlooks the correlation between the rising popularity of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism and 
illegal intolerance and violence against Afro-Brazilian minorities (not to mention homosexuals and other groups 
that are protected under the law as well). I simply wish to note that there are numerous exceptions to Burdick’s 
statement.  
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reaching out to a new, demographically large constituency.” In this line of thinking, 
evangelical Christianity can be a positive force for social change, while the Afro-Brazilian 
religions connections to black activism might actually hinder the black rights movement.  
But even if an evangelical Christian black rights movement has a wider audience, is it 
truly promoting racial equality if it does not fully promote religious tolerance? How can we 
say that such a movement is helping eliminate racism if some of its members denounce all of 
the religious and spiritual traditions that were brought over by black Africans before they 
began converting to the religion of white masters? Embracing equality for members of dark 
skin color labels while supporting the spread of hate toward beliefs associated with these skin 
colors does not equate to powerful positive social change. 34 Black activist and Candomblé 
practitioner Jana Guinond argues that the legacy of slavery can still be felt in Brazil, and that 
“protecting Afro-Brazilian religious heritage” is part of the ongoing fight for equality.35 It is 
reasonable that black activists like Guinond interpret attacks on that religious heritage as 
racism, as the violence and hateful discourse surrounding Afro-Brazilian religions have 
historically been the essence of racism. As Guinond argues, “It's important to highlight the 
huge importance of the black movements in pushing for the appreciation of diversity or 
                                                 
34 This is of course not intended to dismiss efforts made by Christians who embrace both racial equality and 
religious tolerance, for example the tolerance promoted by the Council of Christian Churches of the State of Rio 
de Janeiro, as discussed in chapter 1. There are multiple overlapping social movements at play here, and it is 
difficult to account for all. But Burdick criticizes the link between Afro-Brazilian religions and black activism, 
and he does not justify this with a push for evangelical black movements to at least promote religious tolerance 
if not wholly support African traditions. 
 
35 Lourdes Garcia-Navarro. "Brazilian Believers Of Hidden Religion Step Out Of Shadows." NPR. NPR, 16 
Sept. 2013. Web. 1 May 2016. 
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religious plurality.”36 Even Christian forms of black activism need to promote tolerance of 
African traditions above and beyond the embracing of black identity at the skin color level.   
What light does this discussion shed on the questions outlined in this project? Like 
most religions and various social groups, Pentecostalism is capable of fostering great 
intolerance but also positive social ideals. How do we reconcile the tensions between the 
overlapping, interrelated, and distinct groups and movements that are interacting? I assert 
that while motivations (conscious and unconscious) are hard to get it, the assaults on Afro-
Brazilian religions point to racial prejudice. The attacks violate Brazil’s Racial Equality Act 
and mimic behaviors that were thoroughly racist from the past, so, minimally, it is legitimate 
that Candomblecistas and Umbandanistas perceive racism. Perhaps a brief examination of 
related issues in African countries can illuminate some of the contradictions and provide 
further insight into motivations for intolerance.  
2.3 Parallel Tensions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Not only has evangelical Christianity been accused of intolerance toward African 
beliefs, practices and peoples in Brazil, but this association also exists on the African 
continent. Terrence Ranger argues that Christianity in Africa is unique from in other non-
Western regions. “In Africa, all Christianities have engaged with the cultures, and with the 
politics, of the strong African peoples,” and while Christianity has tolerated and even 
adopted local practices and politics in some cases, it has outright condemned and demonized 
them in others.37 Christianity has been extensively criticized for its imperialistic behaviors, 
                                                 
36 Ibid.  
37 Terence Ranger. “Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa.” Transformation 19.4 (2002), 267. 
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violence, and erosion of local identity on the African continent in the past. Much has evolved 
over the centuries, and contemporarily, each sect and even each church needs to be 
individually evaluated regarding positive or negative contributions to tolerance and religious 
pluralism. At present, though, Terrence Ranger observes, “Evangelicals of all kinds 
“demonize” African religion and seek to expel it both from the private and the public 
sphere.”38 I am concerned with the ways in which some evangelical groups continue to clash 
with African religions and traditions. 
Paralleling the situation in Brazil, a common narrative is that Pentecostal religion can 
save local citizens from demonic entities connected to African religion, and that it can 
destroy these entities. This is a tactic used in numerous and diverse Sub-Saharan countries, 
from Nigeria to South Africa. In some cases Pentecostal attacks on local Africans lead to 
violence, particularly regarding accusations of witchcraft: 
Witchcraft is hardly new, but it has taken on new life recently partly because of 
a rapid growth in evangelical Christianity. Campaigners against the practice [of 
witchcraft] say around 15,000 children have been accused in two of Nigeria's 
36 states over the past decade and around 1,000 have been murdered. In the past 
month alone, three Nigerian children accused of witchcraft were killed and 
another three were set on fire. Nigeria is one of the heartlands of abuse, but 
hardly the only one: the United Nations Children's Fund says tens of thousands 
of children have been targeted throughout Africa… The Mount Zion 
Lighthouse — [named by multiple families] as the accuser of their children — 
is part of the powerful Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria. The Fellowship's 
president, Ayo Oritsejafor, said the Fellowship was the fastest-growing 
religious group in Nigeria, with more than 30 million members. "We have 
grown so much in the past few years we cannot keep an eye on everybody," he 
explained.39 
                                                 
38 Terence Ranger. Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 
30.   
39 "Nigerian Children Deemed Witches Tortured." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 17 Oct. 2009. Web. 01 June 
2016.  
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This abhorrent violence does not immediately appear to be aimed at specific Nigerian 
religious traditions. In many cases, the accused, especially children, have done nothing 
unusual beyond crying for too many hours in the night. But the dialogue of witchcraft has 
evolved out of the historical demonization of African religious practices. In one case, the 
Nigeria Apostolic Church accused an eight-year-old girl of being a witch because she liked to 
sleep outside on hot nights, and they feared she was sneaking off to join a coven.40 While she 
was only a child and not a member of an indigenous African religion, the church connected 
her to a narrative of African witchcraft that professes hate towards indigenous religion in 
order to call for an exorcism to be carried out.  
The most popular interpretation that I have found in the media regarding witch 
hunting has been competition – evangelical Africans are seen as racing against competitor 
congregations to weed out the most sin from local communities. The ability to exorcize 
witches or demons gives the churches credibility in the eyes of their communities, and 
parents pay hefty sums for the exorcisms, increasing churches’ income.41 But, the attackers 
use a language that was borne out of demonizing time-honored African practices, as 
“witchcraft” (which has been used to describe most indigenous forms of African religion) has 
a long and rich history across Sub-Saharan Africa. It is interesting that it is often local 
Africans accusing each other of witchcraft, as it is mostly Nigerians that run and operate the 
churches discussed above.42 The discourse on witchcraft was operationalized by western 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 However, it is interesting to note that many of these churches are offshoots of Western churches that were 
transplanted there. For example, the Mount Zion Lighthouse is a branch of a Californian church by the same 
name. The Californian church reportedly claimed to “have no idea” that the violence against children was going 
on. 
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missionaries in the past and is now used to spread fear and hate on a local scale, somewhat 
similar to the ways in which Afro-Brazilians support Pentecostal churches in Brazil that 
attack Afro-Brazilian traditions.  
Apart from the hysteria surrounding witchcraft, there are, as mentioned, evangelicals 
that target African religions more directly. Rosalind Hackett asserts that “deliverance-
oriented” Pentecostal movements in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa, “are 
prone to violent condemnations of other (competing) religious options, in particular, 
traditional African religions.”43 She connects the local expressions of ‘spiritual warfare’ to 
globalizing discourses of demonism and Satanism, pointing to “a deleterious effect for civil 
society, religious pluralism and freedom of religion.”44 To expand beyond Hackett’s regional 
focus, discourses of satanism are also common in countries where Brazilian missionaries 
have had enormous success, including the lusophone countries, Mozambique and Angola, in 
addition to South Africa. Paul Freston explains that for Brazilian Pentecostalism, when 
transplanted to Africa, “The demonic is reinterpreted from the Afro-Brazilian categories into 
local conceptions of suffering and of the spirit world.”45 Evangelicals undoubtedly demonize 
African traditions and spirits in attempts to bolster their own numbers and to increase power, 
representation, and income. They also surely see many African traditions, religious or not, as 
genuinely sinful or even satanic.46 But, racial elements are ever present. 
                                                 
43 Rosalind IJ Hackett. "Discourses of Demonization in Africa and Beyond." Diogenes 50.3 (2003), 61. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Paul Freston. “The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Brazilian Church Finds Success in Southern 
Africa”. Journal of Religion in Africa 35.1 (BRILL, 2005), 45.  
 
46 Christianity tends to bring with it Western values like heterosexuality, abstinence and monogamy, clashing 
with African practices such as polygyny, for example. 
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More Universal Church Controversies - Accusations of Racism 
In its magazine, Plenitude, the Universal Church details its missionary activities for 
Brazilian readers. It reportedly claims to have been the first church to effectively bring 
Christianity to many African countries. In a 2002 magazine article, it published: “The work 
of evangelization in South Africa began in 1992 in the midst of apartheid. And, ever since, 
many Africans have been rejecting primitive religious practices and beginning to glorify 
Jesus.”47 In response to this, religious scholar Laura Premack writes, “As if these are the only 
two options in South Africa – primitive religions or Universal – when the truth of the matter 
is that South Africa has been a site of Christian missionary activity since the late 1800s.”48 
Premack criticizes another Plenitude publication from 1999 that describes Africans as 
primitive: 
Beyond the beating of the drums, a new sound echoes… in South Africa: the 
praising of the Lord Jesus Christ. Despite being a country traditionally oriented 
toward witchcraft, voodoo and spirit worship, the reality is that many Africans 
have converted to the Gospel, leaving behind these tribal and primitive 
practices. It hasn’t been easy, but determination hasn’t failed Universal’s 
pastors and workers who have, over time, developed an intensive 
evangelization work. Many natives are converting to the Word… The African 
is by nature humble and simple, and has been the victim of abuse and oppression 
for many years.49 
Premack calls this an “ahistorical, racist narrative” that paints Africa as either the 
ancient Africa of slaves and Candomblé, or a modern Africa of famine and violence.50 In this 
                                                 
47 Laura Premack. “‘The Coca-Cola of Churches Arrives’: Nigeria’s Redeemed Christian Church of God in 
Brazil,” in The Public Face of African New Religious Movements in Diaspora: Imagining the Religious ‘Other,’ 
215-232. Edited by Afe Adogame. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., (2014): 221. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
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case the Church condemns African religious traditions in the same context as it employs 
racialized descriptions of inferiority towards Africans.  
 There are several other examples of the UCKG’s negative depictions of Africa in 
their various proselytizing platforms. Paul Freston cites a few of them:  
The continent needs evangelizing… Besides the superstition of the blacks, it 
has been invaded by the Hindu and Muslim religions, which have nothing to do 
with African traditions and customs (TV Record 11/10/97). The continent is the 
victim of deceiving spirits [who] disguise themselves as ancestors (Folha 
Universal 11/10/98). Africans live under the dominion of spiritual forces, 
worshipping demonic beings… Their pagan teachings lead to conformism, 
indifference, and what we might call a “culture of submission” … (Folha 
Universal 9/8/98).51 
The list goes on. Freston cites other examples of UCKG claims against African people, such 
as that they have a lesser concept of marriage and family than Brazilians do and that this 
explains why Africa suffers from AIDS.52  
The conversation is always that the UCKG can save Africans, that it embraces them, 
and that it wants to spread the love of Christ and the Church. It generally paints Africans as 
victims more tham criminals, placing the blame on evil spirits, cultural mistakes, and 
occasionally ruthless leaders.53 The UCKG actively takes pride in gaining black African 
converts. It also denounces racism in its publications. But it describes the converts’ race 
negatively. There is a sense that the Church can save black people not only from their 
                                                 
51 Paul Freston. "The Changing Face of Christian Proselytizing: New Actors from the Global South 
Transforming Old Debates." Proselytization Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets and Culture Wars (2008), 
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52 Ibid.  
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religious traditions, but from their Africanness more generally (e.g. their simplicity and 
victimhood, their incorrect understanding of marriage, etc.).  
Outside of academic literature, the Universal Church has been accused of racism and 
other crimes at the grass roots level in some African countries, especially in South Africa. 
South African pastors have made accusations that the UCKG is racist because it allegedly 
discriminates against them and favors Portuguese pastors. In 2009, six ex-pastors came out 
alleging that the Portuguese pastors could get away with misdeeds (such as adultery) freely, 
while black South African pastors were humiliated in front of larger groups of pastors for any 
wrongdoings. The South African pastors claimed to be paid less, to receive less money for 
their funerals, and to have fewer opportunities in leadership than their Brazilian 
counterparts.54  
Earlier, in 2007, the Universal Church made South African news headlines when it 
distributed condoms specifically to black men in order to stem the HIV/AIDS pandemic in 
South Africa: “The HIV/AIDS campaigners were outraged by the crude racial and sexist 
stereotypes employed by the UCKG’s campaign. The church refused to comment on the 
controversy and quietly dropped its targeted dissemination of condoms.” 55  
Paul Freston argues that that Universal Church’s paternalistic and insulting depictions 
of African people does not actually stem from racial prejudice. He explains that the UCKG 
has insulted host populations made up of various races, from Indians to Luxembourgers. 
Because the Church’s overgeneralizations are not limited to blacks/Africans, Freston argues 
                                                 
54 Ilana Van Wyk, The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in South Africa: A Church of Strangers. Vol. 
47. Cambridge University Press, 2014. p 17 
55 Ibid.  
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that its attitudes stem from Brazilian pastors’ “ethnocentrism and lack of empathy with … 
host populations, whoever they may be” instead of racism.56  
First, exhibiting intolerance toward multiple groups across multiple races does not 
rule out racism. Second, at this point we are debating the definition of racism, and while I 
will not thoroughly define it here, I would argue that there is not a clear line between 
ethnocentrism and racial prejudice. I have not come across issues of the Universal Church 
and other Pentecostal groups demonizing blackness per say, whether in Africa or Brazil. But 
they have demonized Africanness, for lack of a better term, including African culture, 
traditions, and religious beliefs and practices more specifically. These things are certainly 
connected to ethnicity. Can a person’s ethnic prejudice be totally separate and exclusive of 
racism? To debate whether this is separate from race in order to rule out racism seems like 
splitting hairs.57  
2.4 Concluding Remarks on Race 
The incidents discussed in the final section of this chapter are mere samples of the 
religious clashes going on in very diverse Sub-Saharan African countries. These surely do 
not constitute a full picture of the relationship of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God, or Pentecostalism, or evangelical Christianity even more broadly, to local African 
                                                 
56 Freston, “The Changing Face of Christian Proselytizing,” 129.  
 
57 Most definitions of ethnicity include cultural and religious traditions as shared by the group in question. I 
recognize that I am leaving race and ethnicity partly undefined. I am not seeking to define these terms explicitly 
and technically in order to try to prove racism. The African continent houses so many different linguistic, 
cultural, religious, etc. groups with diverse physical characteristics anyways that to define race and ethnicity 
would not clarify very much for this conversation. Rather, the point is that Africans, particularly Sub-Saharan 
Africans residing in countries with substantial Pentecostal presence in the public sphere, have been depicted as 
inferior. 
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religions and citizens. I have chosen to focus on largely negative instances, despite some of 
the profoundly good things that can be connected to missionary Christianity in Africa.58 But 
the examples that I have given demonstrate that the correlation between Pentecostalism / 
evangelical Christianity and hatred of Africanness holds up, at least for some extreme or 
militant groups.  
In an additional citation of a UCKG newspaper publication, Paul Freston explains 
that the Universal Church calls for a change in mentality surrounding black weakness. 
Bishop Macedo reportedly said on a trip to Africa that the African “must believe that he was 
born to grow.”59 The problem is that Macedo wants the African to grow away from his own 
culture toward the culture of Brazilian missionary Pentecostalism: “People here think the 
black man was born to die like a dog. That is their mentality. We are changing this.” 60 Black 
men and women are given little or no autonomy as Macedo sets his church up as the savior in 
a push to change almost everything about them. Whether we want to call this ethnocentrism 
or racism, like Paul Freston and Laura Premack respectively do, or whatever else, there is a 
connection between the Universal Church and other Pentecostal and evangelic groups’ 
targeting of African-derived religious and other traditions, and race.  It is almost certainly the 
case that the groups discussed in this thesis are operating with competition and moral 
superiority in mind. Also, though, whether the various actors at play have race in mind or 
not, it cannot be dismissed as a factor in this intolerance and violence.
                                                 
58 E.g. The charity work and social services, the uniting of communities, the empowering of women in church 
congregations, etc. (which are also things that are difficult to generalize across the diverse African continent). 
 
59 See f.n. 56. 
60 Ibid.  
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Conclusion 
When Kailane Campos was attacked by bible-waving men in 2015, it was emblematic 
of the kinds of intolerance and violence that Afro-Brazilian religions have increasingly 
experienced throughout Brazil. Based on the tense religious climate that had been worsening 
in recent years, Brazilians assumed the attackers were evangelical Christians. When 
Brazilians accuse evangelicals of intolerance and associate them with violence against Afro-
Brazilian religions, they often mean to single out Pentecostalism and specifically militant 
groups of neo-Pentecostals as the perpetrators. Many evangelicals themselves tend to identify 
neo-Pentecostals as the problem (which is not to say that there have not been problems with 
other evangelical sects or churches). While not directly connected to Kailane Campos (as far 
as is known), the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God is perhaps the most accused of 
promoting intolerance overall, and understandably so, because it has spread so much hate 
against Afro-Brazilian religions in such public ways.  
I have demonstrated that the Universal Church utilizes and perpetuates its immense 
presence in the public sphere to target Afro-Brazilian religious groups and practices. It also 
teaches its congregations that a cosmic war is occurring. To borrow the concept from Mark 
Juergensmeyer, in the eyes of the Church a worldly battle between religion and irreligion, 
and especially between good and evil, is occuring. As Juergensmeyer explains, “concepts of 
cosmic war are accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an enduring 
absolutism that transforms worldly struggles into sacred battles.”1 Accordingly, Brazilian 
Universal Church pastors urge their followers to go to battle against ambiguous enemies. 
                                                 
1 Mark Juergensmeyer. “Terror in the Name of God,” in Thinking Globally: A Global Studies Reader (Univ of 
California Press, 2013), 298.  
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They also describe Afro-Brazilian spirits and deities as absolutely evil in a binary system of 
good and bad. The Church carries out exorcisms more than other Pentecostal groups, acting 
on its condemnation of African spirits. Furthermore, the Church provides an “army” of altar 
boys to set an example of fervent proselytism, and many see this as militarization and 
preparation for battle. When condemned for this behavior, and accused of inciting violence in 
the streets, the Universal Church defensively calls itself the victim. How dare the world 
condemn it for exercising its right to condemn others? This inside-out notion of tolerance 
puts the Church at the center of a narrative that reduces the attention placed on the victims of 
the intolerance. Regardless as to who was responsible for Campos’ attack, hate and war 
narratives like those promoted by the Universal Church are at least partly responsible for the 
climate that fostered it.   
While the motives for such attacks are various and vary across groups, there are 
almost certainly elements of religious and territorial competition, pursuit of wealth, moral 
superiority, and condemnation of sin at play. Beyond this, though, Afro-Brazilian religious 
leaders have spoken out with the perception that they are racially targeted. I cannot presume 
to know if targets are selected based on race (which of course needs further research, as will 
be discussed below). There are undoubtedly different motivations for different persons, and 
the level of consciousness and self-reflection on these motivations varies as well. I do, 
however, assert that racial undertones cannot and should not be dismissed. Much of what I 
have discussed in this paper points to racism. 
 Black activists emphasize Candomblé as a symbol of black identity and interpret 
attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions as attacks on blackness, which has been widely advertised 
throughout Brazil. It is safe to assume that many Brazilian evangelical attackers are also 
77 
 
aware of Brazil’s Racial Equality Act and the fact that it protects Afro-Brazilian religious 
groups and practices, making attacks on them violations of the law. Even the government 
associates Candomblé and Umbanda with African ancestry and race, positioning attacks on 
these groups as assaults on racial equality.  
There are also the assaults on African culture and religion in African countries. I have 
given a couple of small but important examples in Chapter 2 to illustrate this issue. The topic 
warrants a much more thorough discussion, of course. I must emphasize that I expressly do 
not argue that all evangelical Christianity always targets indigenous African religion and/or 
culture. However, I have demonstrated that there is a correlation between evangelicalism 
(and specifically Pentecostalism) and discourses of demonism and Satanism. This is written 
on fairly often by scholars of African religion. Such discourses set African religious practices 
and spirits up as demonic in opposition to morally and even culturally superior Christianity.  
In the realm of Africa, perhaps most illuminating with regard to the research 
questions in this thesis is the intolerance carried out by the UCKG in South Africa and other 
Sub-Saharan countries, persistently describing Africans as inferior. Paul Freston calls these 
behaviors “ethnocentric” as opposed to exhibiting racial prejudice. But there is a clear 
preferencing of Christian (and in this case Brazilian) identity over the indigenous identity of 
the “simple” African who exists in a “culture of submission.” I do not agree that ethnic 
prejudice can be separated out so easily from racial prejudice. Moreover, the depictions of 
Africans are insulting and essentialist, and the assaults on indigenous religions undermine 
tolerance and plurality, regardless as to whether we label the Church’s behaviors as 
ethnocentric or racist or whatever else.   
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What is at stake surrounding these tensions? Where do we go from here? In this 
section I will briefly examine some broader implications of this research and provide some 
suggestions for further research.  
I. The Death of Secularization Theory and Pentecostalism in Politics 
Much like other modern vehement forms of religion, such as global political Islam, 
Hindu nationalism in India, radical Buddhists in Asia, etc., neo-Pentecostalism is part of a 
large trend of increasing religious fervor that defies secular notions of modernity. As 
discussed in the introduction, Jose Casanova describes three prongs of modern secularization 
theory – decline in belief (regarding the number of believers), increase in plurality or 
differentiation as mainline religions lose numerical dominance, and relegation of religion to 
the private sphere. While the first two prongs are not challenged by my work and are 
arguably descriptive of the world in general, the third prong is largely disproven by 
religiosity in the global public sphere. In my case, the notion of the privatization of religion is 
entirely opposite of evangelical, Pentecostal, and especially neo-Pentecostal success in Brazil 
and globally. Commenting on larger global trends, Juergensmeyer explains that “[today’s] 
radical religious movements refuse to observe the boundaries that secular society has set 
around religion – keeping it private rather than allowing it to intrude into public spaces.”2 
Pentecostals and especially neo-Pentecostals embrace the public sphere in ways that would 
shock secular theorists like Weber, Marx, and Durkheim.  
In this thesis I have examined neo-Pentecostal and wider evangelical uses of the 
public sphere to advertise, proselytize, entertain, and to spread hate against Afro-Brazilian 
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and African traditions. The use of the public sphere to push conversion and evangelical 
morality undermines secularity, and more importantly, the expression of hate undermines 
religious pluralism and religious tolerance. Where religion is tied to ethnicity, with specific 
attention to connections between Afro-Brazilian religions and African ethnic or racial 
heritage, this spread of hate in the public sphere also has grave consequences for race 
relations. I have demonstrated these issues with attention to the media and other proselytizing 
platforms, but I have not sufficiently addressed the politicization of religion.   
Juergensmeyer explains that in reaction to increasing favor toward secularization by 
mainstream society and politics, resurgent religious activists have “dismissed the efforts of 
secular culture and its forms of nationalism to replace religion.”3 Accordingly, these activists 
have “challenged the idea that secular society and the modern nation-state are able to provide 
the moral fiber that unites national communities or give the ideological strength to sustain 
states buffeted by [failures].”4 This is accompanied by radical religious groups becoming 
increasingly political. 
Beyond spreading messages to the Brazilian public (and citizens of numerous other 
countries), the Universal Church and other morally conservative evangelical groups have 
begun to increasingly participate in politics. They have amassed representation in and formed 
alliances with government in ways that parallel the rise of the religious right in the United 
States. Furthermore, because the number of evangelical voters is increasing in Brazilian 
elections, Brazilian politicians pander to the evangelical vote to increase their likelihood of 
election and reelection. While I have not detailed the political aspect of evangelical presence 
                                                 
3 Juergensmeyer. “Terror in the Mind of God,” 349. 
4 Ibid. 
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in the public sphere in this thesis, it is worth briefly mentioning here to reemphasize the 
extent of evangelical power and representation outside of the private sphere.   
In a detailed description of the Universal Church’s presence in the Brazilian political 
sphere, Ari Oro describes the participation of the UCKG and other evangelical churches in 
local and federal government. He cites specific elections to illustrate the growth of an 
“evangelical block” in congress. Furthermore, he explains that the UCKG is a leader in 
encouraging high evangelical participation rates in elections: 
Due to the efficacy of its institutional charisma, the [UCKG] has given, within 
its own religious group, a new meaning to the specific act of voting and to the 
general perception of politics in general, putting both of them in its own 
religious logic. This is an important explanatory key for the high level of loyalty 
in voting and the growing political success verified in every new election. 
Furthermore, the political practice of the UCKG is producing a mimetic effect 
on other evangelic churches, which tend to imitate its way of doing politics. Its 
political insertion, mainly through the Liberal Party, has not remained 
unnoticed by the political parties, making the fact a relevant actor in the current 
Brazilian political conjuncture.5 
In relation to this, evangelicals have used their representation in politics and alliances 
with politicians to further their assaults on Afro-Brazilian religions. In fact, when Vagner 
Gonçalves da Silva sorts evangelical attacks on Afro-Brazilian religious groups into six 
categories, one of the categories is “attacks arising from alliances between Evangelical 
churches and politicians.”6 To illustrate this, Gonçalves da Silva gives examples where such 
alliances have resulted in Brazilian states attempting to ban any religious practices or 
ceremonies resulting in the death of animals, in spite of the fact that Afro-Brazilian religions 
                                                 
5 Ari Pedro Oro. "The Politics of the Universal Church and its Consequences on Religion and Politics in 
Brazil." Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 1, no. SE (2005): 0-0.  
6 Vagner Gonçalves da Silva. Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on 
Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil. Mana, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 3, Selected 
Edition, 2007. Web. 
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often emphasize animal sacrifice as a key requirement for building relationships with the 
orixás. This use of the law to ban Afro-Brazilian religious animal sacrifice is but one of 
numerous examples where an evangelical presence in politics is impacting the Afro-Brazilian 
religions.  
Apart from African-derived religions, the politicization of Christianity and especially 
Pentecostalism impacts numerous other groups as well. I have given a very short and limited 
set of examples to demonstrate an evangelical presence in Brazilian politics, and a much 
larger conversation is warranted in other projects. While there is not space in this thesis to 
discuss the many details of evangelical participation in politics, it is crucial to note that such 
a participation does exist, and that it has large implications for Brazilian politics and society 
more generally.7  
II. Further Implications 
The reasons behind a growing evangelical presence in Brazilian politics and politics 
in other countries of the world are varied. Difficult questions such as religious pluralism and 
the secular state, abortion, homosexuality, and the death penalty have politicized many 
Christians in many countries. These issues are both political and religious, and religious 
groups behave politically to weigh in on them. As I used Juergensmeyer to explain 
previously, many religious groups feel that secular politics lack the morality to govern 
                                                 
7 Pentecostals have entered politics with mixed results. In general, Pentecostal politics are morally conservative 
and not socially progressive. However, as briefly touched on throughout this thesis, some Pentecostal and wider 
evangelical groups are promoting religious tolerance and/or racial equality. For example, Benedita da Silva, a 
Pentecostal woman that served as Rio’s vice governor and later governor from 1998 to 2002, formed a “tense 
coalition” with Pentecostal political organizations and dared to face down “massive police corruption and 
brutality while simultaneously going after the commandos’ stranglehold of black favelas.” Paul Amar. The 
Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism (Duke 
University Press, 2013), 148. 
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properly. These issues are playing out in Brazilian local and national politics, putting much at 
stake even beyond the tolerance and respect that should be designated to the Afro-Brazilian 
religions. 
For example, above and beyond the scope of this project, there is much at stake in the 
realm of homosexual and women’s rights. Pentecostals in Brazil and globally denounce 
homosexuality and oppose abortion and other women’s reproductive rights. While I have 
chosen to focus on the Afro-Brazilian religions in this paper, a much larger conversation 
needs to be had with respect to the rights of other vulnerable groups, minorities or otherwise.  
Finally, as I have demonstrated here and previously, the most concerning aspect of 
the spread of intolerance and hate on the part of militant Pentecostals is the massive growth 
and reach of the movement. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Universal Church of the 
Kingdom of God has approximately 12 million members worldwide and this membership is 
growing quickly. Pentecostalism is rapidly gaining success around the world with specific 
concentrations in the Global South, and if militant versions of Pentecostalism are 
fundamentally connected to religious intolerance, or racism, or homophobia, etc. it is crucial 
to understand this. It is further crucial to understand the implications of the politicization of 
this religious movement.  
III. Future Research 
There is much more work that needs to be done to understand the growth and the depth of 
evangelicalism, and Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism more specifically. The ramifications of 
this movement are global and need to be studied on a global scale. However, the local context in each 
case is immensely important, and it is crucial to beware of overgeneralizing the actors at play. While 
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it is necessary to describe trends for the sake of making comparisons and drawing meaningful 
conclusions, each church should be studied individually on the ground before it is praised or 
condemned. Relatedly, more attention must be given to each of the more specific themes in this 
paper. For example, more evidence and analysis are needed regarding the connections between 
militant Pentecostalism and intolerance, hate speech, violence, racism, etc. To sum this up, in his 
discussion on the relationships between Pentecostalism, Afro-Brazilian religions, and black rights 
activism, John Burdick asserts, “A great deal more listening and analysis is required at the grassroots 
level.”8  
Furthermore, while social processes are complex and difficult to fully characterize with 
quantitative modeling, this discussion relies perhaps to largely on anecdotal evidence and qualitative 
analysis. Quantitative studies would greatly improve the depth of the research. For example, it is 
important to look at different Candomblé and Umbanda temples according to their racial composition 
and compare this with the frequency of attacks on each temple. Are white Umbanda houses as subject 
to intolerance as Umbanda houses with large black populations? Do the frequencies of attacks very 
according to region/neighborhood? These are just a couple of examples of countless studies that could 
benefit an understanding of the changing religious landscape in Brazil and its impacts on race 
relations. This project, along with those detailed in the sources used in this paper, are only the 
beginning of a much larger conversation.  
                                                 
8 John Burdick. “What Is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil”. Latin 
American Research Review 34.2 (1999). Latin American Studies Association: 109–31. 
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 Candomblé Umbanda “Evangelicals of Pentecostal 
Origin” 
Total 167,363 407,331 25,370,484 
“White” 50,670 (30%) 220,526 (54%) 10,470,009 (41%) 
“Brown” 65,777 (39%) 112,435 (27%) 12,401,216 (49%) 
“Black” 48,849 (29%) 70,927 (17%) 2,144,556 (8.5%) 
“Yellow” 1,214 2,158 237,121 
“Indigenous” 853 1,286 117,538 
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